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Abstract 
Researchers in moral psychology have initiated projects to investigate moral identity; 
however, they agreed that a precise definition and methodology of moral identity has been 
lacking in establishing the value of this new area. One of the challenges is that cultural 
explorations of moral identity are absent. Moral identity may take different forms in different 
cultures, or play an important role in morality in some cultures but not in others (Hardy & Carlo, 
2005). The present dissertation was aimed at investigating how Western Canadian and Eastern 
Chinese cultural orientations relate to moral identities. Three studies were conducted. 
In the first study, I introduced a new empirical approach for assessing moral identity to 
establish a culturally inclusive list of prototypical conceptions of a highly moral person. It 
provided a foundation for Studies II and III. The new empirical approach combines several 
features of moral identity measures that have not been integrated into a coherent approach. The 
new approach starts from Western individuals’ prototypical conceptions of a highly moral 
person. Because there is no previous Chinese study using this approach to study moral identity, a 
free listing of the self-importance of moral attributes was used to generate culturally exclusive 
attributes, which were then combined with the Western moral attributes to create a culturally 
inclusive list of attributes to describe a highly moral person.  
In the second study, I examined similarities and differences in moral identity between 
Canada and China in the contexts of family, school and community/society. Cultural differences 
in self-importance of moral identities in each context, cross-context differentiation in moral 
identity, as well as relative importance of value-domains for defining a person’s moral identity 
were examined. In both cultural groups, Benevolence and Universalism-tolerance were selected 
and rated as the cores of defining a moral person. In addition to the core of moral 
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identities,Chinese participants defined a highly moral person more broadly than Canadian 
participants. With regard to the context, Chinese participants rated the mean level of moral 
identity more importantly in the context of school and the context of community/society than 
Canadian participants. Canadian participants’ moral identities on average were more 
differentiated (less interrelated) across the three contexts than Chinese participants.  
In the third study, I focused on a sample of bi-cultural Chinese Canadians to extend the 
investigation of the socio-cultural impact on moral identity. In general, it was found that 
Chinese-Canadian mean levels of moral identity and value domains were more similar to 
European Canadians than to Chinese in China. This finding supports the notion of acculturation, 
with each person’s heritage self-concept being shifted a little over time and acculturated to the 
norms of mainstream culture. In addition, neither length of residency in Canada nor immigration 
status predicted the mean-level of moral identity. Only mainstream acculturation remained a 
significant predictor.  
 Across these studies, a key finding seemed to be the critical role that moral identity has 
some similarities between Eastern and Western cultures, yet it has a different definition to people 
and is used in varying levels of degrees from one culture to another. The studies provided 
invaluable insight into the relative role of identity in the domain of morality across cultures. 
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General Introduction 
Since Lawrence Kohlberg initially proposed his stage theory of moral development, 
morality has been heavily investigated in Psychology over the last fifty years. For decades, moral 
psychology primarily focused on moral reasoning and moral judgment or decision-making 
through Kohlberg’s developmentally defined stages (Hardy & Carlo, 2011). According to 
Kohlberg (1969), moral behavior results from moral judgments. If one acts without a moral 
judgment, the resulting action has no particular moral status. However, Blasi (1983) argued that 
moral judgment might not lead to moral action unless individuals’ moral concerns and values are 
embedded into the person’s sense of self and internalized as part of their moral identity. 
According to Blasi’s (1983) self-model of moral functioning, the centrality of morality to one’s 
self-identity might be a major factor bridging the gap between moral judgment and moral action. 
Therefore, moral psychology has begun to move beyond moral reasoning to pay more attention 
to the moral self in childhood and moral identity in adolescence.  
Researchers (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002; Arnold, 1993; Colby & Damon, 1992; Hardy & 
Carlo, 2005) in moral psychology have initiated various projects to investigate moral identity; 
however, they agreed that a precise definition and methodology of moral identity has been 
lacking in establishing the value of this new area. Those researchers have shown that adding the 
self-concept to the moral identity model can enrich moral psychology, but the empirical research 
of moral identity faces challenges on various fronts. Particularly, cultural aspectsof moral 
identity have not been studied so far. According to Schwartz’s Value Circumplex (Schwartz, 
1992), basic values are organized into a coherent system that can help explain an individual’s 
decision-making, attitudes, and behavior. However, cultural psychologists suggested that people 
both within and across cultures have different self-concepts, cognitive processes, and value 
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orientations. Therefore, this research introduces a new culturally inclusive approach that 
combines assessments of the content of individuals’ moral identities.  
The present dissertation research aims at dealing with the major limitation of current 
research on moral identity as identified above. Study I introduced a new empirical approach for 
assessing moral identity cross-culturally. A culturally inclusive list of moral values in both 
Western and Chinese cultures was generated. In Study II, similarities and differences in moral 
identity between Chinese and Canadian cultures endorsing independent versus interdependent 
self-structures in the three contexts (family, school/work and community/society) were 
investigated. This cross-cultural study tested a new methodology for moral identity and 
empirically investigated how cultural orientation shapes individuals’ moral identities. In Study 
III, moral identity in a bicultural group of Chinese-Canadians was studied as an attempt to better 
understand the moral identities of this increasingly important cultural group in Canada.Study III 
explored the question of how moral identity interacts with cultural identity in this particular 
cultural group in Canada.  
In the following introduction, in order to address the important relationship between 
moral identity and cultural processes, three major steps were taken. First, the question of what 
role culture plays in morality in general was discussed. Second, Erikson’s multidimensional 
model of identity was introduced to the literature of moral identity. Third, research on moral 
identity was presented and its limitations were discussed.  
Morality and Culture 
Lawrence Kohlberg (1969) proposed a six-stage theory of moral development. In his 
original studies, moral dilemmas were presented to children and their responses were analyzed. 
According to Kohlberg, the six stages of morality are 1) obedience and punishment orientation; 
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2) self-interest orientation; 3) interpersonal conformity; 4) authority and social-order 
maintenance; 5) social contract orientation; 6) universal ethical principles. 
Much cross-cultural research has explored the applicability of Kohlberg’s model. One 
review explored 45 studies that had been conducted which had investigated the different levels of 
moral reasoning in 27 different cultural areas around the world (Snarey, 1985). The results 
indicated some universality in moral reasoning. In all cultural groups there were adults who 
reasoned at the conventional levels (stages 3 and 4), and in no cultural groups did the average 
adults reason at the preconventional level (stages 1 and 2). However, evidence of 
postconventional reasoning (stages 5 and 6) was not universally found. Although every urban 
Western sample contained at least some individuals who showed reasoning based on justice and 
individual rights, it does not describe well the moral reasoning of the non-Western world. In a 
more recent study, Gibbs, Basinger, Grime, and Snarey (2007) revisited Kohlberg’s cognitive 
developmental approach and universality claims by reviewing 75 cross-cultural studies 
conducted in 23 countries. The results generally validated the cognitive developmental 
expectation for moral judgment development in childhood and early adolescence. However, 
some cross-cultural studies yielded a mixed picture concerning areas of moral judgment in late 
adolescence and adulthood. The researchers suggested that the higher levels (stages 5 and 6) in 
Kohlberg’s model and scoring manual did not capture the moral reasoning of the non-Western 
world and must be broadened beyond Western traditions.  
In the 1980s and 1990s several anthropologists and cultural psychologists objected to 
Western-centric moral psychology, and explored other moral domains in different cultures. 
Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, and Park (1997) posited three different ethics found around the 
world: the ethic of autonomy, in which the autonomous and independent individual is at the core 
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of moral values; the ethic of community, in which the group and social cohesion are the major 
concerns; and the ethic of divinity, in which God and a holy life are the fundamental moral 
concerns. 
This way of differentiating types of morality not only shows different domains of 
morality, but also gives insight into cultural variations (Shweder et al., 1997). Shweder, 
Mahapatra and Miller (1987) compared the judgments of people from India and the United 
States. Participants from both countries were presented with many descriptions of actions that 
could possibly be argued to be moral or social transgressions. Different judgments were found 
between Indians and Americans. Religious considerations were correlated with the judgments 
from Indians. For example, in India, a widow does not eat fish, wear jewelry and bright clothing, 
and a son does not get a haircut or eat chicken immediately after his father’s death. Moreover, 
Indians think that if they violate these practices, they do serious wrong, whereas Americans do 
not think this way. 
In a similar view, Miller (2007) examined cultural differences in interpersonal morality 
referring to the responsibility of meeting the needs of others. In Miller and Bersoff's (1992)cross-
cultural study between Americans and Indians, they found that in both cultures, helping tended to 
be seen as highly desirable and as a perceived responsibility. However, Americans had the 
dominant tendency to treat helping as a matter for personal discretion, whereas Indians tended to 
see helping as amoral obligation. In other words, Americans emphasized personal freedom of 
choice when considering helping others in need, whereas Indians considered helping more of a 
moral obligation.  
This study was undertaken among middle-class European-American children and adults 
sampled from New Haven, Connecticut and among middle-class Hindu-Indian children and 
MORAL IDENTITY AND CULTURE                                                                                     5 
 
adults sampled from Mysore City in Southern India (Bersoff & Miller, 1993). Using standard 
back translation techniques, Indian researchers conducted data collection in India in the local 
language of Kannada. Recruited from a setting that emphasizes relatively traditional Hindu-
Indian cultural beliefs and practices, the Indian sample represented a cultural group emphasizing 
what has been characterized as interdependent cultural views of the self (Markus & Kitayama, 
1991). Recruited from an urban European-American community, the American sample, by 
contrast, represented a cultural group that has been characterized as emphasizing more 
independent cultural values. Participants were compared with regard to hypothetical scenarios, in 
whichagents failed to act prosocially for selfish reasons to someone experiencing high, moderate 
or minor need. In a between-subjects design, they portrayed the agent’s relationship to others as 
either that of parents, best friends or strangers. Culturally specific versions of the scenarios were 
used, with interviews among the Indian sample conducted in the local language of Kannada by 
native researchers. The results indicated cross-cultural differences in the conceptualization of 
morality. Even though there was no cultural difference between Indians and Americans on high 
need situations, Indians more frequently viewed responsiveness to another’s needs as a moral 
obligation than did Americans in all relationships that involved minor needs or the moderately 
serious needs of friends or strangers. Americans’ assessments of interpersonal responsibilities 
were considerably affected by the emotional closeness of the relationship, specifically the parent-
child relationship. Reflecting the emphasis on the duty-based nature of interpersonal 
commitments held in collectivist settings, it was found that the Indians’ assessments would 
remain relatively unaffected by the closeness of the relationship. 
Jonathan Haidt (2007) expanded Shweder’s theory, resulting in his Moral Foundations 
Theory. In opposition to rational theories of moral reasoning like Kohlberg’s, Haidt argues that 
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morality is based on quick, automatic processes that were formed over human evolution. 
According to Haidt (2007), the five moral foundations are harm, fairness, ingroup, authority, and 
purity. First, the ethic of Harm/Care identifies individuals’ tendency to detect and relieve 
suffering and harm-doing, and to value virtues such as kindness and compassion. Second, the 
ethic of Fairness/Reciprocity identifies people’s desire to punish cheating and injustice in social 
relationships. Third, the ethic of Ingroup identifies the value individuals place on fidelity to 
family and the group over other allegiances. Fourth, the ethic of Authority/Hierarchy underscores 
the belief that groups are legitimately organized into dominance hierarchies, in which dominant 
or high status individuals receive certain privileges while at the same time being expected to 
protect and provide for subordinates. Fifth, the ethic of Purity expresses individuals’ desire to 
avoid violating behaviors defined by religious authorities. Disgusting behaviors, such as eating 
feces and corpses, or expressing profanities in relation to God, are seen as sick and less than 
human. 
The moral foundation model has been tested in a cross-cultural sample (Graham, et al., 
2011). Researchers administered an online moral foundations questionnaire and compared 
participants from Eastern cultures (South Asia, East Asia, and Southeast Asia, n = 2,258) to 
participants from Western cultures (U.S., U.K., Canada, and Western Europe, n = 104,893) with 
regard to their moral foundation endorsement. They found Eastern participants showed stronger 
concerns about Ingroup and Purity compared to Western participants, and were slightly more 
concerned about Authority. These differences were further explained in light of established 
cultural differences in collectivism (Triandis, 1995) and the role of purity concerns in daily life 
and religious practice in south Asia.  
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 In sum, the moral psychology literature together from Kohlberg’s moral reasoning to 
Shweder’s moral ethics and Haidt’s moral foundations illustrates that morality variescross-
culturally. People may share a similar foundation for their morals around the world, but there are 
many disagreements about the relative importance of their moralities both between and within 
cultures. In this dissertation, a cultural psychology approach was applied to study morality by 
focusing on how cultures instill ways of thinking and foster certain values (Norenzayan& Heine, 
2005). This approach recognizes that there may be some basic universal moral concerns, but it 
argues for powerful influences of culture on various aspects of morality.  
Concept of Moral Identity 
Moral identity has been defined as the extent at which a person views moral values as 
central to his or her identity (Blasi, 1983; Colby& Damon, 1992; Erikson, 1968; Hardy & Carlo, 
2005, 2011; Hart & Fegley, 1995). In other words, if individuals perceive moral values such as 
being caring, just, forgiving, and honest as central for defining their sense of self, they have a 
strong moral identity. Lapsley and Lasky (2001) argued, “The formation of moral identity is the 
clear goal of both moral and identity development, and these two developmental tracks are 
ideally conjoined in the moral personality” (p. 358). This intersection of morality and identity 
within the domain of moral personality renders the moral identity construct an important 
predictor of moral motivation and sustained moral commitment across the life-span (Blasi, 1983; 
Colby & Damon, 1992; Hardy & Carlo, 2011).  
 Blasi (1983) was the first to speculate that moral identity plays an important role in 
understanding the relationship between cognitive judgment, moral motivation, and moral action. 
He suggested that moral behavior is influenced by the following three components: a moral self, 
a sense of personal responsibility for moral action, and a motive for self-consistency. A moral 
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self is the degree to which morality is central to a person’s sense of self and identity. Blasi argues 
that, for some individuals, moral values are deeply rooted at the very core of who they are. 
However, for others, these values are not important in their daily lives. He suggested that once 
moral values are identified as crucial elements of the self and are integrated into a person’s 
identity, the individual is motivated to act according to those values.  
The second component is a sense of personal responsibility or obligation to engage in 
moral rather than immoral behavior. Moral individuals feel compelled to engage in moral action 
because one’s behavior is a measure of their moral worth or virtuousness (Kohlberg & Candee, 
1984). Moral emotions of guilt, remorse, or shame are elicited when individuals fail to engage in 
moral behavior (Blasi, 1983).  
The final component is self-consistency and is achieved when moral individuals behave 
in ways that are congruent with their moral identities. For example, some individuals have a 
main life goal to care for others to demonstrate compassion. Others may find it most important to 
remain unbiased and just in all situations. Blasi’s (1983) model suggests that when moral values 
are central to a personal identity, individuals interpretlife experiences with a higher degree of 
moral relevance and meaning than those who view non-moral values as central to who they are.  
Recently, Hertz and Krettenauer (2016) conducted a meta-analysis to examine the 
relationship between moral identity and moral behavior. One hundred eleven articles from a 
variety of academic journals were included. In general, they found a positive correlation between 
moral identity and moral behavior. However, effect sizes varied in those studies. The effect size 
was lower in non-Western cultures than in Western cultures. The authors suggested that the low 
effect size may be due to the lack of validity of the current moral identity measures in non-
Western cultures or due to different conceptualizations of moral identity between cultures.  
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Erikson’s Interaction Model of Moral Identity 
 Erikson (1968) argued that identity and morality are interconnected and necessary for 
ethical strength. He stated that “an ethical capacity is the true criterion of identity” (Erikson, 
1968, p 39). He also noted that “identity and fidelity are necessary for ethical strength” (p 126). 
This suggests that a moral identity is the goal of both moral development and identity 
development. Moral identity, like identity in general, is postulated to develop in adolescence, 
which is a period when ethical and moral values become salient as identity-relevant concerns 
(Erikson, 1968). However, Erikson’s conception of identity development has been neglected in 
the literature of moral identity. In his influential work “Identity: Youth and Crisis”, Erikson 
defined identity both internally and social-contextually: “Ego identity is awareness of self-
sameness and continuity and the style of one’s individuality which coincides with the sameness 
and continuity of one’s meaning for others in the immediate community” (Erikson, 1968, p.50). 
In other words, identity formation is resolved by reconciling the identities imposed upon oneself 
by social contexts such as one’s family and society. Erikson’s multidimensional model of 
identity should be introduced to the literature of moral identity.   
 In the book entitled “Identity and The Life Cycle”, Erikson (1980) defined identity in 
three domains according to the degree of embeddedness of the self in context. The first domain is 
“ego identity” which includes fundamental beliefs about oneself, and was postulated to be 
temporally consistent and resistant to change. At the intersection of self and context, Erikson 
named “personal identity” as the second domain, which is the set of goals, values, and beliefs 
that distinguish oneself from others. “Personal identity” includes career goals, dating 
preferences, work choices, and other aspects of self that identify a person as a unique individual. 
The most contextually-oriented domain is “social identity,” where one’s goals, values, and 
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beliefs have been integrated into one’s sense of self from groups to which one belongs. It 
includes categories such as native language, country of origin, and racial background. Indeed, 
Erikson’s concept of identity was meant to establish a social-developmental approach 
encompassing all elements of self, from the most internal ego conflicts to the individual’s 
embeddedness in a cultural context (Cote, 1993). However, most research in moral identity so far 
has only focused on “ego identity”.  
These three domains of identity were further conceptualized slightly into a hierarchical 
analysis of organization method from the person outward (e.g., Kurtines& Silverman, 1999) or 
from society inward (e.g., Cote, 1996) by Neo-Eriksonian theorists. The “ego identity”, 
“personal identity”, and “social identity” were identified, in accordance with three levels of 
analysis: “ego-personal, personal-social, and social-structural” (Cote, 1996). The “ego-personal” 
level of analysis contains intrapersonal content areas such as personal characteristics and sense 
of self. The “personal-social” level of analysis contains interpersonal content areas such as 
family and friendship. The “social-structural” level of analysis contains social and cultural 
contents such as politics and society. The combinations of Eriksonian levels of analysis do not 
focus neatly on only one of the levels. Those analyses that focus on the individual level, such as 
personal identity, tend to incorporate aspects of ego or social identity as well. Moreover, models 
oriented principally toward the social-structural level often point to structural aspects of society 
and culture in which social identity is embedded (Schwartz, 2001). This organization reflects 
Erikson’s view of lifespan development as occurring at the interface of self and society. As a 
result, identity represents a coherent picture that one shows to both oneself and to the outside 
world. Career, romantic preferences, religious ideology, and political preferences, among other 
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facets, come together to form the combination that represents who one is (Schwartz, 2001). 
Moral identity research should not only focus on the individual level. 
Neo-Eriksonian alternative identity models have been put forth to examine contextual 
differences in expanding Erikson’s three elements of identity development. For example, 
Kurtines and Silverman’s (1999) “Co-constructivist Perspective” is conceptualized as a shared 
process between individuals and their social and cultural environments. Kurtines and Silverman 
maintained that social institutions are responsible for fostering individuals’ skills (e.g., schools, 
family, and religion). In turn, individuals who demonstrate a healthy identity may tend to be 
more socially responsible and less disruptive within society (Kurtines& Silverman, 1999). As 
another example, Adams’ contextual approach (Adams & Marshall, 1996) also highlighted social 
context. He assumed that individual identity could be embedded into social contexts (family, 
school) and structural contexts (society and culture). The effects of the social and cultural 
contexts are implemented through the individual interactionallevel, as in cultural norms being 
taught to children by their parents at home, and peers and teachers at school or community. Thus, 
Adams’ person-in-context viewpoint incorporated both the individual and social elements of 
identity and the uniqueness in the social and cultural environment. Finally, Cote (1996) 
constructed a sociological view of identity, called the “Identity Capital Model”, which primarily 
describes the social-structural level of analysis. Cote (1996) addressed the mechanism by which 
identity is formed through negotiation with family members, peers, and social institutions.  
Moreover, Bronfenbrenner’s ecological systems theory (Bronfenbrenner, 1979) provided 
a useful support for organizing the Neo-Eriksonian three levels (ego-personal, personal-social, 
and social-structural levels) of analyses. In Bronfenbrenner’s view, human development is a 
dynamic, interactive process between individuals and various ecologies that range from 
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interpersonal relationships to external ideologies of the culture (Bronfenbrenner& Morris, 1998). 
These environments included the microsystem (the immediate surroundings such as family, 
school, and peer group), the mesosystem (the linkages between microsystems), the exosystem 
(the content which indirectly affects individuals through elements of society and major societal 
institutionssuch as media, neighbors, and social welfare), and themacrosystem (culture, religion, 
society). In Bronfenbrenner’s view, these four systems are interrelated, which means that things 
occurring at the smallest level of context can affect what occurs in the largest context (Hong & 
Ham, 2001). In other words, individuals’ sense of ego identity is a result of interactions with the 
people in their family, classmates in school, friends and neighbors in the community, and 
institutions of the country that they were raised in. Therefore, studying moral identity in relation 
to contexts on multiple levels is the key to understanding the development of the moral identity 
construct. 
Both Erikson’s mission in identity research and Bronfenbrenner’s ecological system in 
human development were to establish a social-developmental approach encompassing all levels 
of self, from the most basic personal characters in ego identity to the individual’s uniqueness in a 
socio-cultural context. However, there is a lack of theoretical and empirical research on 
contextual differences (e.g., personal-social and social-structural levels of analyses) in moral 
identity research. To what extent moral identity is a function of interacting in a specific context 
is a major question that has been only raised recently in moral identity research (Hardy & Carlo, 
2011; Krettenauer et al., 2016).  
Recent social cognitive approaches to moral identity have sought to address a view of the 
“personal-social” level of analysis to develop the concept of identity. This line of research may 
provide some preliminary evidence of context specificity in moral identity. The social cognitive 
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view of the self-concept as a network of identity schemas recognizes that people have multiple 
identities and that only a few of these identities can be held in consciousness at any given time 
(Markus & Kunda, 1986). Consequently, defining oneself as a moral person will only produce 
moral motivation when moral identity is currently available in a given context and in a relevant 
situation. Similarly, when a different aspect of moral identity is available in a particular context 
and situation, people should be more motivated to behave in a manner that is consistent with the 
values and goals associated with that identity in that specific context (Aquino et al., 2009). For 
example, in an experimental study, participants were asked to list as many of the 10 
commandments as they couldin order to activate participants’ moral identity. The results 
indicated that when participants’ moral self-schema was activated, the likelihood that they will 
intend to behave in a prosocial manner increased (Aquino et al., 2009).  
Althoughmost accounts of moral identity research assume identity is relatively stable 
across situations and contexts, like a personality trait, the social cognitive approach of moral 
identity provides insight on situations that individuals’ moral identities can be activated or 
deactivated in situations (Monin & Jordan, 2009). However, the Eriksonian social-structural 
level of analysis has not been fully elaborated in a social cognitive approach even though 
researchers have realized that moral identity can be dependent on a specific situation and 
context.  
Challenges in Defining and Investigating Moral Identity  
In order to understand moral identity in regards to the self-concept, multiple studies have 
investigated the representation of self-schemas in relation to moral identity (Hart & Carlo, 2011). 
Previous research on moral identity describes a range of differences in the ways in which 
individuals may decide on courses of action, based on salient personal goals and beliefs (e.g., 
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Colby & Damon, 1992; Matsuba & Walker, 2005).Even though moral identity researchers have 
agreed to study self-conceptson moral identity, the empirical research of moral identity faces 
challenges on various fronts. In the following section, two major challenges are raised in order to 
conceptually and empirically assess moral identity: narrow range of moral attributes, and context 
in culture.  
Challenge #1: Narrow Range of Moral Attributes 
Several studies have assessed moral identity indirectly through examining the 
psychological functioning of people who have been identified as leading morally exemplary 
lives. Colby and Damon (1992) conducted the initial study of this type. Participants included 
twenty-three individuals who demonstrated extraordinary commitments to moral ideals over an 
extended period of time. Commitment to moral values was identified in order to distinguish these 
participants from the general population.The researchers found that the most distinguishing 
characteristic of these exemplary individuals was the extent to which they identified themselves 
as agents of moral goodness and relentlessly pursued these goals. In addition, Hart and Fegley 
(1995) studied care exemplars among inner-city youth. They found that care exemplars described 
themselves with more moral traits such as honest, moral, and trustworthy than individuals in a 
matched comparison group, suggesting that these personality features were a more central part of 
their identity. Matsuba and Walker (2005) studied 40 young adults who had been nominated by 
social service agencies because of their moral commitment as volunteers, as well as a 
comparison group who were matched on demographical factors such as age, gender, level of 
education, and ethnicity. They found that moral exemplars were more consistent in developing 
unity between the self and morality in their interviews. For example, moral exemplars had 
formed relatively deep ideological convictions, and their personal beliefs and values were central 
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to who they were and had a significant influence on their moral involvements in their 
community.  
A more direct way to investigate the integration of morality in the adolescent identity was 
developed by Arnold (1993). Arnold (1993) investigated adolescents’ conceptions of personal 
virtue and their interrelations with moral reasoning and behavior. A sample of 80 adolescents 
were first asked to identify their core qualities from a list of virtues, and then responded to a 
series of interview questions asking them to explain the personal importance that these qualities 
had for them as individuals. Arnold (1993) found that participants varied greatly in their virtue 
choices: some of the adolescents identified exclusively with moral qualities such as being honest, 
helpful, and fair, whereas others responded that moral qualities were not importance to them. In 
addition, participants varied in their explanations of the personal importance of these qualities. 
Some adolescents defined a good person in moral terms, along with personal agency and 
emotional resonance. Others defined a good person by personal achievement and self-interest 
alone, with little concern for others (Arnold, 2000).  
Barriga, Morrison, Liau, and Gibbs (2001) adapted Arnold’s (1993) interview and 
designed a questionnaire measure named the “Good-Self Assessment” to assess the centrality of 
moral virtues to the self-concept. Participants were presented with a diagram of three circles, and 
asked to rate the importance of each moral and non-moral trait to their self-concept. Each trait 
was described with two synonyms such as “honest or truthful” in order to enhance respondents’ 
understanding of the items. There were eight moral traits (considerate, honest, helpful, 
sympathetic, generous, sincere, fair, and dependable) and eight non-moral traits (imaginative, 
industrious, outgoing, athletic, funny, logical, independent, and energetic). The average of the 
non-moral item scores was subtracted from the average of the moral item scores to generate a 
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measure of moral self-relevance. Positive scores reflected greater endorsement of moral traits, 
whereas negative scores reflected greater endorsement of non-moral traits. They found that 
moral self-relevance negatively predicted externalizing behaviors such as delinquent and 
aggressive behaviors. 
Aquino and Reed (2002) developed a well-known self-report measure of moral identity. 
They proposed that individuals whose self-schemas were organized around moral traits would 
describe themselves in a way that reflected moral self-definitions. They asked laypeople to 
generate an open-ended list of characteristics, traits, or qualities that best represent a highly 
moral person. They found that the majority of respondents characterized a moral person as 
possessing the following nine traits: caring,compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, 
hardworking, honest, and kind whichwere selected from a total of 376 traits after content 
analyses and self ratings. These traits also corresponded to the many traits mentioned by moral 
researchers and educators, showing evidence of construct validity (Lapsley & Lasky, 2001; 
Walker & Pitts, 1998). Then participants were first asked to envision how a person with these 
attributes would think, feel, and act. Then those participants responded to ten items about 
whether it is personally important for the individual to possess a moral quality (internalization), 
and how much the individual believes that his or her everyday activities communicate morality 
to others (symbolization).  
Even though previous studies have attempted to measure moral identity directly, the 
number of moral prototypes needs to be broadened in assessing moral identity (Hart & Carlo, 
2011). For example, Walker and Pitts (1998) found that the typology of a highly moral person 
included (a) principled and idealistic, (b) dependable and loyal, (c) integrity, (d) caring-
trustworthy, (e) fair, and (f) confident (c.f., Walker & Pitts, 1998, Table 2). Walker and Hennig 
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(2004) also suggested that there were different types (brave, caring, and just) of moral 
exemplars. They found that the brave characteristic was primarily related to dominance, the 
caring characteristic was primarily related to nurturance, whereas the just characteristic was 
related to conscientiousness and openness. As discussed in the previous section, Haidt (2007) 
proposed five distinct moral foundations: care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, 
authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation that were differentially salient in different 
cultures. These results suggest that people may form multiple moral prototypes and call the 
field’s attention to this wider range of moral virtues to be included in moral identity research. 
Challenge #2: Context, Culture, and Moral Identity 
According to Triandis (1995), culture is defined as a set of human-made objective and 
subjective elements that in the past have (a) increased the probability of survival, (b) resulted in 
satisfaction for the participants in an ecological niche, and thus (c) become shared among those 
who communicate with each other because they have a common language and live in the same 
time and space. The subjective elements include culturally specific beliefs, attitudes, norms and 
values that are developed through socialization and specific cultural experiences, which in turn 
influence social behaviors across various social settings (e.g., family, school, and workplace) 
Therefore, moral identities are likely shaped by the particular values and assumptions shared by 
people living in specific cultures. In the following sections, three possible explanations for 
observed cultural differences in moral identity are discussed.  
Cultures and Self-Concepts 
One possible explanation of cultural variation in moral identity might involve 
individuals’ cultural objectives regarding self-concept. Self-concept represents central or 
desirable goals that serve as standards to guide the selection or evaluation of behavior, people, 
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and events (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001). The sense of self and values of the society that children 
are raised in provides a framework that shapes parental behaviors and interactions with children, 
as well as the resulting developmental outcomes (Phinney & Ong, 2007). Within all cultures, 
parents engage in practices aimed at socializing the child to become a responsible adult member 
of the society (Phinney & Ong, 2007). Yet the patterning of self-concepts varies widely across 
cultural groups. 
There are two different ways people might see themselves: independent versus 
interdependent.According to Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) cross-cultural model of self-
concepts, the self can be thought to derive its identity from inner attributes. These attributes are 
assumed to reflect an essence of the individual in which they are the basis of the individual’s 
identity; they are perceived to be unique; they are self-contained; they are perceived to arise from 
the individual and not from interactions with others. Markus and Kitayama (1991) referred to 
this self-contained model of the self as the independent view of self. Another way of considering 
the self can be viewed as fundamentally connected to, and sustained by, a number of significant 
relationships. Rather than elaborating on how behavior and thoughts derive from the individual’s 
inner features, viewing oneself as part of an encompassing social relationship means that 
behavior is recognized as contingent upon perceptions of others’ thoughts, feelings and actions. 
With this view, individuals are not perceived as separate and distinct entities but as participants 
in a larger social unit. Their experience of identity reflects their experiences and their 
relationships with others. Markus and Kitayama (1991) labelled this second construal of self as 
the interdependent view of self.  
Self-concepts are shaped by the cultural practices that influence what individuals tend to 
value and believe. At the same time, cultural practices are also shaped by the kinds of self-
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concepts a culture’s members have. In this way, culture and self can be said to make-up each 
other (Shweder et al., 1997). One pioneering study exploring self-concept in different cultures 
was done by Geert Hofstede (1980). He explored the values and concerns of IBM employees 
around the world. He gave questionnaires including items that explored values purportedly 
related to individualism and collectivism to 117,000 employees in IBM offices in 40 different 
countries. He found that people participating in individualist cultures such as the United States, 
Canada, and Western European nations were more likely to elaborate on independent aspects of 
themselves, and they came to feel distinct from others and emphasized the importance of self-
consistency. People participating in collectivist cultures like Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the 
South Pacific were more likely to attend to interdependent aspects of their self-concepts 
(Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1994).  
These cultural differences in the self-concept are not just limited to individuals’ self-
descriptions. They can be observed in brain activation patterns, as demonstrated in functional 
magnetic resonance imaging studies. In one experiment, Chinese and Western participants were 
instructed to consider how well a number of adjectives characterized themselves or characterized 
their family members such as mothers while they were in a brain scanner (Zhu, Zhang, Fan, & 
Han, 2007). While doing this task, Westerners showed different regions of brain activation, 
suggesting that they represented themselves and their mothers in distinct ways. In contrast, when 
the Chinese were evaluating themselves or their mothers, they showed activation patterns in the 
same brain regions for these two tasks. This suggests that Chinese representations for themselves 
and for their family members are not that distinct and both reflect on the self-concept. Thus, 
close relationships form a core part of the self for those with interdependent selves.    
Cultures and Cognitive Processes 
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A secondpossible explanation of cultural differences in moral identity is based on 
dynamic relationships between culture and cognitive style, including attentional, perceptual, and 
attributional processes. That is, people with different cultural backgrounds may attend to 
different aspects of the same social event, and make different causal attributions, all of which 
may contribute to cultural differences in moral identity.  
Recent evidence from cognition and perception research has shown that relatively 
collectivistic East Asians view the world holistically, tending to perceive the world as consisting 
of an interrelated whole. Consistent with this perspective, East Asians assign causality more to 
situational factors and this should mean that they would be especially good at detecting relations 
among different events (Ji, Peng, &Nisbett, 2000). In contrast, individualistic Westerners tend to 
engage in analytic cognition, focusing on and attributing causality to the primary object in the 
field without much consideration of its context (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001). 
Socialization processes (e.g., parenting, peer groups, and societies) prepare individuals to master 
culturally specific attentional and perceptual patterns (Ishii, Reyes, &Kitayama, 2003). 
Evidence that Eastern and Western cultures exhibit holistic and analytic thinking 
tendencies, respectively, comes from a variety of methodologies and has implications for other 
psychological fields. In one of the early studies, European Americans and Chinese Americans 
were asked to describe what they saw in Rorschach ink blots (Abel & Hus, 1949). The 
Rorschach is a projective test in which people report what they see in an ambiguous stimulus. 
The results revealed that these two groups of Americans apparently saw things quite differently. 
The European Americans were more likely to describe what they saw based on a single aspect of 
the card. In contrast, Chinese Americans were more likely to give “whole-card” responses, 
describing what they saw based on the entire image on the card. In an eye-tracking study 
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conducted by Chua and colleagues (2005), cultural differences were found in eye movements. 
Presented with the same picture of a focal object (e.g., a tiger) placed on a background (e.g., the 
forest), Chinese participants were observed to have rapid eye movements between the 
background and the focal object whereas American participants detected the focal object sooner 
and focused on it longer.  
Cultural differences in cognitive style have been discovered not only in the domains of 
attention and perception, but also that of causal attribution. The Fundamental Attribution Error 
(FAE)is a well-established phenomenon (Ross & Nisbett, 2011). The FAE refers to the tendency 
of people to overestimate a person’s behaviors as produced by his or her dispositions (e.g., 
personality and attitudes) and underestimate behavior to the social and environmental forces 
(e.g., social pressure) influencing the person. 
The FAE consistently has been shown in various contexts through major studies focusing 
on North Americans. However, several studies have established an association between 
culturally divergent lay theories of the FAE, showing that, compared with North Americans, East 
Asians are more likely to attribute an event to contextual stimuli and less likely to be 
dispositional in their attributions (Nisbett, et al., 2001). In one study demonstrating this 
difference, Morris and Peng (1994) analyzed newspaper articles about similar manslaughter 
cases in America and China. It was shown that American reporters attributed the murder more to 
dispositions of the murderer (e.g., having an aggressive personality), while Chinese reporters 
attributed the event more to the situational factors (e.g., poor social relationships and family 
pressure). In the same study conducted by Morris and Peng (1994), participants were shown a 
picture of a fish is swimming ahead of a group, and were asked to explain why the front fish is 
swimming ahead of a group. They found that Chinese were more likely to make external 
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attributions to explain why a single fish is swimming ahead of a group (e.g., the fish is being 
chased by others), whereas Americans were more likely to explain the fish’s behavior in terms of 
internal attributes (e.g., the fish is leading the others).  
The same question was further explored with Americans and Indians in moral domains 
(Miller, 1984). The participants were asked to describe a situation when someone had behaved in 
either a prosocial manner or a deviant manner and then to explain why the person had behaved 
that way. The reasons people gave for the actor’s behaviors were examined, whether they made 
explanations that referred to the actor’s general disposition or to the context. The results revealed 
that Americans showed clear evidence for the fundamental attribution error by explaining 
people’s behaviors as largely due to their personalities. In contrast, Indian adults showed 
evidence for a reverse FAE because they tended to focus more on the situation than on the 
disposition.  
Cultures and Value Orientation  
A third possible explanation of cultural variation in moral identity might involve 
individuals’ value orientations. Cultural psychologists suggested that people both within and 
across societies have quite different value orientations that reflect their different heritages, 
personal experiences, and social locations (Triandis, 1995; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). 
Individuals’ cultural backgrounds may shape their value priorities. Schwartz (1994a) found that 
conservation (security, conformity, and tradition) is prioritized in societies based on 
interdependent social relations. On the other hand, intellectual autonomy (curiosity, open 
mindedness, creativity) and affective autonomy (pleasure, exciting life) are prioritized in 
societies based on independent social relations. Another study found that the independence items 
(personal agency, self-direction, self enhancement, and creativity) are more relevant for persons 
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who stress independence; whereas the interdependence items, such as communion with others, 
concern for family and close others, fulfilling duties, conformity and responsibilities to in-
groups, and self-effacement are more relevant for individuals who stress interdependence (Kam, 
Zhou, Zhang, Ho, 2012).  
Cultural variations in value orientations may be particularly salient in a context of 
multiculturalism. Adapting to a new identity and cultural environment are challenges for 
immigrants. Many immigrants modify their own values to conform more to those that prevail in 
their new home country. At school, immigrant adolescents and young adults feel pressured to 
adopt the culture of their new home country. As a result, they may focus on the achievement 
aspect of identity formation in order to be successful in the new environment. At home, they may 
encounter a different environment that reflects the values and traditions of their country of 
origin. Thus, they may maintain their traditional values and identity in family practices (Knafo & 
Schwartz, 2001). Moreover, immigrant adolescents and young adults may wish to communicate 
values from their country of origin that resemble values in the new culture. If these value 
systems differ, they must choose between the two value systems or find a unique way to 
integrate the two contradictory identities (Berry, 1990).  
In sum, examining selves, values and identities in both cross-cultural and within cultural 
differences in immigrants would provide a synthesizing framework for addressing Eriksonian 
contextual (personal-social) and cultural (social-structural) levels of analysis in identity 
development. Immigrants are moved from a familiar environment in which the rules of the 
government and their communities are well defined. During their migration, their context 
changes, and all that they are familiar with becomes the unknown. Such changes are inevitable 
because of the different belief system and cultural norms that exist in their host country. 
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Thus,this cultural approach should be adopted in studying moral identity to fill in the gap 
between contextual and cultural aspects. 
Overview of Studies 
Limitations of Previous Research and Contributions of the Current Studies 
Limitations of previous research make it necessary to further investigate links among 
culture, context, and moral identity. First, a culturally inclusive measure of moral identity is 
absent from all of the previously reviewed literatures. Recent research in virtue ethics, character 
education, and political orientation across different cultures and religious traditions has 
suggested that the moral domain needs to be broader than the issues of harm and fairness 
currently represented in moral psychology scales (Haidt, 2007). Values research has much to 
offer to the empirical study of morality and is too often ignored by moral psychologists (Graham 
et al, 2011). Clearly, in the moral identity literature, many values are moral values, even if 
morality is defined only in the narrow terms of benevolence and universalism. However, there is 
a danger that some other common domains are missed when identifying a list of important moral 
values in the traditional moral identity literature. For example, intelligence and achievement 
were also viewed as characteristics of being a good person (Arnold, 1993), yet these traits have 
not drawn much attention in moral identity research. Thus, similar to the method developed by 
Aquino and Reed (2002) and Arnold (1993), the new approach of assessing culturally inclusive 
moral identity should start from individuals’ prototypical conceptions of a highly moral person.  
Second, few studies have examined moral identity in a specific context. According to 
Erikson’s multidimensional model of identity, identity clearly interacts with contexts. However, 
moral identity research has not addressed this issue so far. Conceptually, research on moral 
identity is based either on the personality trait approach (Lapsley & Hill, 2009) or on the socio-
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cognitive approach (Monin & Jordan, 2009; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004). Trait-based approaches 
assume cross-context similarities in behavioral dispositions relevant for individuals’ moral 
conduct. Socio-cognitive approaches, by contrast, stress the malleability of situation-specific 
knowledge structures and schemas that guide moral action (Monin & Jordan, 2009). However, 
neither trait-based nor socio-cognitive approaches consider cross-context differentiation. Thus, 
the current studies extended previous literature in moral identity to investigate within- and cross-
cultural differences in three contexts (family, school, and community/society), which varied in 
terms of closeness of interpersonal relationships.  
Third, and most importantly, no study has attempted to explore cultural aspects in moral 
identity, as suggested by the “social-structural” level of analysis in Erikson’s theory of identity. 
Thus, there is a risk of an ethnocentric bias in defining the developmental standard on the basis 
of moral identity in Western cultures. The description of Western moral identity may fail to 
generalize to other cultures because it is limited to a Western understanding of morality. It is 
reasonable to assume that cultural differences in moral identity may be due to either 
measurement issues of moral identity (e.g., a narrow range of moral value attributes) or different 
conceptualizations of the moral identity construct (e.g., moral identity research started within a 
Western ethnocentric view of moral outlook). Thus, a cross-cultural comparison of moral 
identity demands a carefully designed study. The present research examined the influence of 
cultural orientation on moral identity, comparing Eastern and Western cultures. 
Research Plan  
Three studies were conducted to address these limitations described above (a narrow 
range of moral values, specific contexts, and cultural differences). Erikson’s “ego-personal”, 
“personal-social”, and “social-structural” levels of analysis were applied in the moral identity 
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research. Study I introduced a new empirical approach for assessing moral identity to establish a 
culturally inclusive list of prototypical conceptions of a highly moral person. It provided a 
foundation for Studies II and III. The new empirical approach combines several features of moral 
identity measures that have not been integrated into a coherent approach. Similar to the method 
developed by Aquino and Reed (2002), the new approach starts from Western individuals’ 
prototypical conceptions of a highly moral person (Eriksonian “ego-personal” level of analysis). 
Because there is no previous Chinese study using this approachto study moral identity, a free 
listing of the self-importance of moral attributes was used to generate culturally exclusive 
attributes, which were then combined with the Western moral attributes to create a culturally 
inclusive list of attributes to describe a highly moral person.  
Study II focused on similarities and differences in moral identity between Canada and 
China, as a study of the “personal-social” and “social-structural” levels of analyses in Erikson’s 
theory of identity. Moral identities in the contexts of family, school and community/society were 
examined in Western Canadian and Eastern Chinese samples. Cultural differences in self-
importance of moral identities in each context, cross-context differentiation in moral identity, as 
well as relative importance of value-domains for defining a persons’ moral identity were 
examined in the Study II. In addition, a sample of bi-cultural Chinese Canadians was studied to 
extend the investigation of the socio-cultural impact of culture on moral identity in Study III. A 
person’s cultural identity and sense of belonging to a particular culture may shape his or her 
moral identity. Conflicts experienced by Chinese immigrants between traditional moral concepts 
and Western values of independence in the contexts of family, school, and society were explored 
in the current study. 
Research Questions 
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In the previous section we discussed possible explanations for why research needs to 
consider context and cultural influences on moral identity as well as limitations in measures and 
conceptualizations of the moral identity construct. As a potential solution, we suggested (a) 
including a broader range and cultural inclusion of value domains in measures of moral identity; 
(b) assessing moral identity in various social contexts with regard to closeness of interpersonal 
relationships (family, school, community/society); and (c) investigating cultural differences 
between Western Canadians and Eastern Chinese in moral identity. The current studies were 
designed to investigate these three factors together. Based on the research discussed above, the 
general research questions are:Do individuals differ systematically across cultures in how their 
moral identities are defined in various social contexts? More importantly, how do cultural 
orientations influence the individual’s characteristic level in moral identity? 
Study I: Creating a culturally inclusive measure for moral identity 
A culturally inclusive measure of moral identity is absent from all of the previously 
reviewed literatures. Recent research in virtue ethics, character education, and political 
orientation across different cultures and religious traditions has suggested that the moral domain 
needs to be broadened and include issues other than harm-avoidance and fairness, which are 
currentlypredominant in moral identity measures (Miller, 2007). Values research has much to 
offer the empirical study of morality and is too often ignored by moral psychologists (Graham et 
al, 2011). Clearly in the moral identity literature, many values are moral values, even if morality 
is defined only in narrow terms of welfare and fairness concerns. However, there is a risk that 
other value domains will be missed when identifying a list of important moral values in the 
traditional moral identity literature. Thus, similar to the method developed by Aquino and Reed 
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(2002) and Arnold (1993), a new approach of assessing culturally inclusive moral identity starts 
with individuals’ prototypical conceptions of a highly moral person.  
Study I-a: Identifying value attributes that describe individuals’ prototypical conception of 
a “highly moral person” in a Western cultural context (North America) 
At the time Study I was conducted, four studies were available that had investigated 
people’s prototypical conceptions of a highly moral person using a free listing method. Three out 
of four studies were based in North-American samples (Hardy, Walker, Olsen, Skalskoi, & 
Basinger, 2011; Lapsley & Lasky, 2001; Walker & Pitts, 1998), whereas one study was based on 
a cross-cultural comparison of the Marianna Islands, the Philippines, Taiwan, Turkey, U.S., 
Venezuela, and Palau (Smith, Smith, & Christopher, 2007). A pool of values that make a highly 
moral person was generated based on these four studies. This pool provided the stimulus material 
for all the remaining studies. 
In Walker and Pitts’ (1998) study, 120 Canadian adults (ages ranged from 17 to 65+) 
were asked to generate personality characteristics that were seen as descriptive of a highly moral 
person using a free-listing procedure. The total number of attributes provided by the 120 
participants was 1249. Several judgment rules were used to reduce the number of descriptors that 
participants had listed: any phrases and sentences were divided into single descriptors; adjectives 
were used instead of nouns; synonymous terms were combined; antonym pairs which were 
generated less frequently were deleted; idiosyncratic responses were eliminated (Walker & Pitts, 
1998). Finally, 92 attributes as descriptive of a highly moral person were included in the study. 
In addition to the free listing, participants rated each of the 92 attributes with regard to “how 
characteristic the following descriptors are of a highly moral person” using a 7-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (almost never true) to 7 (almost always true). Six out of 92 attributes (irrational, 
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naïve, eccentric, detached, solitary, and is a leader) were rated below the neutral point, and thus 
were considered as rather uncharacteristic of a highly moral person (Descriptors and ratings see 
Walker & Pitts, 1998, Table 1).  
Lapsley and Lasky (2001) extended the previous work by testing 73 American college 
students’ moral prototypes. Participants were given instructionsand provided with a maximum of 
20 lines to list as many attributes of “good character” as they can think of. Similar judgment 
rules as in Walker and Pitts (1998) were used to reduce the number of attributes. This yielded a 
list of 170 trait adjectives. Then, these attributes were rated by 121 American college students in 
a question of “how characteristic the following descriptors are of a person who has good 
character?” on a 7 Likert scale, ranging from 1 (almost never true) to 7 (almost always true). 
Five attributes (lucky, popular, shy, provocative, and well-noticed), were rated below the neutral 
point. (Descriptors and ratings see Lapsley & Lasky, 2001, Table 1).  
Hardy et al. (2011) used a similar procedure to study adolescents’ conceptions of what if 
means to be a moral person. Two hundred American adolescents (12-18 years) free listed 1446 
descriptors. By using the Walker and Pitts’ (1998) procedure, the initial list was reduced to 94 
descriptors of highly moral persons. Moreover, 100 early adolescents aged 11-14 years, and 99 
late adolescents aged 15-18 rated the 94 attributes with regard to how well they described a 
highly moral person using from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very well). Two attributes (cool and married) 
were rated below the neutral point by early adolescents; 24 attributes were rated below the 
neutral point by late adolescents (Descriptors and ratings, see Hardy & Walker, 2011, Appendix 
A).  
Smith, Smith, and Christopher (2007) provided some cultural evidence of mapping 
everyday moral prototypes. They recruited college student participants from the Marianna 
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Islands (n = 152), the Philippines (n = 151), Taiwan (n = 297), Turkey (n = 148), U.S. (n = 202), 
Venezuela (n = 148), and Palau (n = 255). Participants were asked to freely list all features of the 
good person that came to mind. The study provided 64 attributes (see Smith et al., 2007 table 1).  
In the current study, all attributesfrom the fourprevious studies were selected:92 attributes 
of describing a highly moral person were generated in Walker and Pitts’ study (1998); 170 traits 
were generated in Lapsley and Lasky’s study (2001); 94 traits each for early and late adolescents 
were generated in Hardy et al.’s study (2011); and 64 traits from Smith et al., (2007). In order to 
reduce the number of attributes, the following rules were used in the current study:  
1. Synonyms across the four studies were merged. 
2. Attributes that only appeared once across the four studies were dropped. 
3. Negative descriptors that indicated that a particular attribute was considered 
uncharacteristic of a highly moral person were eliminated. 
Following this procedure, a total list of 80 value attributes was generated (see Table 1).  
In summary, in this study I-a, a list of values that defines a highly moral person in 
Western cultures was generated based on these four studies. In a pilot study, participants were 
encouragedto add additional attributes they felt were missing on the list. Only one out of twenty 
participants added one attribute that was not included in the list (“forward thinking”). It indicated 
that the 80 attributes adequatelydescribed a moral person at least in the Canadian sample. 
Moreover, we also included a cross-cultural study done by Smith et al., (2007) because their 
study mainly focused on universal concepts of a highly moral person.  
Study I-b: Identifying value attributes that describe individuals’ prototypical conceptions 
of a “highly moral person” in an Eastern cultural context (China) 
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Since there was no previous study related to value attributes using a Chinese sample, a 
free listingprocedure was used to generate culturally exclusive attributes that describe a highly 
moral person. 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and nine(36 male, 68 female, and 5 participants who did not indicate their 
gender) university students (Mage = 19.91, SD = 1.21) from North-East Normal University in 
Chang Chun were asked to identify attributes of a highly moral person. All responses were 
translated into English and back translated into Chinese by two bilingual graduate students at 
Wilfrid Laurier University.  
Procedure 
Participants were asked to “write down the characteristics and attributes of a highly moral 
person”. Participants were told to list at least 10 attributes, but 20 blanks were made available 
(See Appendix A for the Chinese measure). The moral attributes provided by Chinese 
participants were compared with the list of attributes used in Study Ia from predominantly 
Western cultures.  
Results 
 A total of 1,924 attributes were created by Chinese university students. Similar to Walker 
and Pitts’ (1998) procedure, several steps were used to reduce the number of value attributes that 
was generated in the Chinese sample. First, attributes which were mentioned only once or twice 
by participants were dropped. Second, synonyms within the Chinese attributes list were 
collapsed into one attribute. Third, phrases in the remaining Chinese attributes list were 
reworded as adjectives. Then, the remaining attributes were compared with the attributes in the 
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Canadian list from Study Ia. Synonyms between the two lists were excluded from the Chinese 
list. Based on this procedure, seventeen culturally specific attributes were identified: peaceful, 
credible, incorruptible, warm-hearted,motivated, ambitious, diligent, civilized, patriotic, 
solidaric, careful, prudent, filial piety, dedicated, principled, active, and outgoing.It turned out 
thatseven value attributes that were on the list generated in Study Ia (empathic, having integrity, 
self-assured,nice,cheerful,virtuous, upstanding) had no specific translation in Mandarin but were 
synonymous with other Chinese terms found to be descriptive of a highly moral person in the 
Chinese sample. These attributes do not have a direct Chinese translationso we could not include 
them. These seven attributes were therefore dropped from the list. In sum,a total of 90 culturally 
inclusive moral values was generated and used in Studies II and III. Table 2 illustrates all 
90attributes that are grouped into three categories: common attributes that were mentioned in 
two cultures, unique Chinese attributes, and unique Western attributes (for a translation of these 
attributes in Mandarin as used in Study II see Appendix B).  
 In summary, Study Ib created a culturally inclusive list of value attributes defining a 
highly moral person. In addition to overlapping value attributes cross-culturally, the Chinese 
listused fordefining a moral person was illustrated by specific values that not only reflect upon 
interpersonal morality such as “credible and warm-hearted”, but also imply Chinese socialism 
(e.g., patriotic,careful, prudent). There are certain concepts such as filial piety and solidaric that 
have been mentioned in the literature as specific Chinese/Asian values for a long time (Hwang, 
1999). Other attributes such as peaceful, principled, credible, and incorruptible that are 
consistent with Confucian values of living in harmony with others and societies. According to 
Confucianism, only when a person is able to suppress inborn desires and to arrange relationships 
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with others in accordance with humanity is that person qualified to be called a moral person 
(Hwang, 1999).  
Study Ic: Identifying value domains of individuals’ conception of a highly moral person 
across cultures 
 In order to assess what value domains define a persons’ moral identity, Schwartz’s 
circumplex model was employed as an analytical tool. Schwartz’s model has been validated in 
several independent studies with large cross-cultural data sets (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al., 
2012). In its original version, the model identifies ten domains that constitute the basic structure 
of human values (Universalism, Benevolence, Conformity, Tradition, Security, Power, 
Achievement, Stimulation, and Self-direction, see Schwartz, 1992). More recently, Schwartz et 
al. (2012) provided a refined model that further differentiated the original ten into 19 value 
domains. However, the differentiated model does not invalidate the original ten value domains 
(cf. Schwartz et al., 2012).   
Based on the theoretical description of the value domains, as well as items that have been 
used to assess these value domains, all 90 value attributes used in the present study were 
classified into value domains. The more differentiated 19 values domain model was used 
whenever possible. However, if a particular value differentiation was not reflected in the list of 
90 attributes, the original model was applied (this was the case, for instance, for the distinction 
between Self-direction thought and Self-direction action). If a value attribute was deemed too 
ambiguous for classification, it was considered as unclassified.  
All 90 attributes were classified by five independent coders (graduate students and a 
senior researcher) who had familiarized themselves with Schwartz’s circumplex model. The 
intercoder agreement ranged from .82 to .90 with a mean score of .85 for the Western 80 moral 
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attributes. The codings for Chinese unique moral attributes were discussed and all discrepancies 
were unanimously resolved. This process yielded 13 value domains that made up the list of 90 
value attributes as used in the present study (for a full list of all value attributes and their 
categorization see Table 3): Benevolence-dependability (12 attributes out of 90), Benevolence-
caring (11 attributes), Universalism-tolerance (9 attributes), Universalism-concern (4), Self-
direction (5), Conformity-rules (5), Conformity-interpersonal (7), Achievement (9), Face (2), 
Tradition (2), Hedonism (2), Humble (4), and Security (6). Twelve attributes (out of 90) were not 
classified (see Figure 1). Even though Universalism and Benevolence were clearly 
overrepresented as descriptors of a highly moral person, together these domains accounted for 
just 40% of value attributes.  
 In summary, we applied the value research approach which has much to offer the 
empirical study of morality, but is too often ignored by moral psychologies in the study ofmoral 
identity. In this approach, the culturally inclusive moral values in both Canadian and Chinese 
samples were coded into 13 domains. Clearly, our resultssuggestedthat in addition to 
Benevolence and Universalism, themoral domain needs to be broader than the issues of caring 
and fairness.  
Discussion 
The main goal of Study I was to refinethe measurement of moral identity. Previous 
measures of moral identity, such as the well-known self-report measure of moral identity, 
Aquino and Reed (2002) used a narrowly defined set of values (see Figure 1) that mostly focuses 
on Benevolence and Universalism-concern (e.g., caring,compassionate, fair, helpful, and kind). 
However, recent research in virtue ethics, character education, and political orientation has 
suggested that the moral domain needs to be broadened and should include issues other 
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thancaring and fairness which are currently overrepresented in moral identity research (Haidt, 
2007; Miller, 2007). Figure 1 illustrated different moral domains between the current measure 
and Aquino and Reed’s (2007) measure. Our results suggest that people may form multiple 
moral domains and this should call the field’s attention to this wider range of moral virtues to be 
included in moral identity research.  
 There is also a risk of an ethnocentric bias in defining the developmental standard on the 
basis of moral identity in Western cultures. The description of Western moral identity may fail to 
generalize to other cultures because it is limited to a Western understanding of moral 
norms.Cross-cultural research on moral judgment in other cultures such as India (Miller, 2007) 
and Brazil (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993) has revealed moral considerations beyond the universal 
morality of care and fairness. Moral identity should also involve values about tradition, 
hierarchical role fulfillment, and moral expectations of loyalty to the local or national group from 
non-Westerners. Thus, the present refined measure of moral identitywas formed by assessing 
value-orientations inclusive of people from both cultural backgrounds and their explicit and 
spontaneous descriptions to define a highly moral person. Our present studies illustrated this 
breadth in that Chinese participants gave open-ended responses when asked to define a highly 
moral person in their own words. Parallel to the universal morality position, many made 
reference to harm, human welfare, and fairness. However, others made reference to moral values 
in accordance with Confucianism which reflected major dyadic relationships and social identities 
in Chinese society. From the perspective of Confucianism, morality is to socialize individuals to 
suppress personal desires in social interactions, and to eliminate “Xiao Wo”, personal-centered 
by emphasizing “Da Wo”, societal-centeredness actions (Hwang, 1999). As a consequence 
ofChinese ideology of being a highly moral person, “I” is transformed into “we” and society with 
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the group is strengthened. This assumption has been supported in social identity literature. Wang 
(2004)compared cultural self-constructs between Chinese children and European Americans 
children. She found that Chinese children often described themselves in terms of social roles and 
context-specific characteristics which further preparethem to become competent members of 
their respective societies (Wang, 2004). In the next study, cultural similarities and differences in 
moral identity between Canada and China were examined.  
Study II 
Study II was conducted to addressthe threeissues of moral identity simultaneously: (a) 
culturally inclusive attributes describing a highly moral person from Study I were tested in 
Canadian and Chinese samples; (b) Specific contexts (family, school, and community/society) 
were implemented into moral identity research to address the “personal-social” level of analysis; 
(c) Evidence on how cultural representations (social-structural level of analysis in identity) shape 
moral identity in these three contexts were provided across cultures. 
 Researchers (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002; Hardy & Carlo, 2011) in  moral psychology 
have initiated projects to investigate moral identity; however, they agreed that a precise 
definition and methodology of moral identity has been lacking in establishing the value of this 
new area. One of the challenges is that cross-cultural explorations of moral identity are absent. 
Moral identity may take different forms in different cultures, or play an important role in 
morality in some cultures but not in others (Hardy & Carlo, 2005). The main goal of the present 
study was to investigate how Western and Eastern cultural orientations relate to moral identities. 
Previous cross-cultural research on moral development was mostly focused on moral reasoning 
(Gibbs, Basinger, Grime, & Snarey, 2007), moral emotions (Krettenauer & Jia, 2013) and moral 
motivation (Miller, 2007). Thus, the present study explored a largely uncharted territory and 
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could provide invaluable insight into the relative role of identity in the domain of morality across 
cultures. However, taking a cross-cultural perspective on the moral identity construct involves 
more than just replicating moral identity research in different cultures. It requires expansions in 
the conceptualization and measurement of the construct itself. 
Moral Identity, Self-concept, and Culture  
 According to Erikson (1980), moral identity is the goal of both moral and identity 
development. Moral identity is thus defined as the extent to which a person views moral values 
as central to his or her identity (Hardy & Carlo, 2011). Some people feel that being honest, 
compassionate, fair or generous is central for their identity, whereas others consider values such 
as being independent, successful or outgoing as more important. Moreover, identities are 
differentiated into multiple facets because they reflect unique relationships and social 
interactions that characterize an individual’s various social roles (Burke & Tully, 1977). 
Although individuals have numerous social roles (e.g., spouse, student, and worker), they 
develop role identities only for those roles that they internalized into their self-concepts. 
However, according to cross-cultural psychological theory, it is possible to arrange diverse 
cultures along interpretable value dimensions in different social roles. For example, Hofstede 
(1980) introduced one of the most well-known conceptions, the dimension of “Collectivism vs. 
Individualism”. This has subsequently gained wide acceptance and has been used in many 
studies in moral psychology (e.g., Bedford & Hwang, 2003; Krettenauer & Jia, 2013; Miller, 
2007).  
 To capture the difference between individualistic, Western cultural orientations and 
collectivistic, non-Western cultural orientations, Markus and Kitayama (1991) introduced the 
concept of self-construals. The independent self-construal, which tends to be dominant in 
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individualistic cultures (e.g., the United States, Canada, Western Europe), emphasizes attributes 
that make individuals unique. It includes mental representations of individual traits, abilities, 
motives and values along with the motivation to be independent (Markus &Kitayama, 1991). By 
contrast, an interdependent self-construal is dominant in collectivistic cultures (e.g., China, 
Japan, and Korea). In these cultures, individuals tend to define themselves in the context of 
social relationships and group memberships. This view of the self includes mental 
representations of social norms and others’ opinions. An interdependent self-construal is linked 
to the motivation to adjust to the demands of others and to maintain harmony within one’s group 
(Markus &Kitayama, 1991). 
These independent and interdependent self-construals may construct two ways of 
conceptualizing moral identities: one of them having at its center individual rights, and the other 
having at its center, the social responsibility that arises by valuing sociality (Miller, 2007). In the 
former type of moral identity, individuals are seen as having interests that need to be defended 
against others. In communally oriented moral identity, duties arise from the individual’s 
community occupying a central place. For example, Rozin, Lowery, Imada, and Haidt (1999) 
postulated two different ethics: the ethic of autonomy, in which the autonomous and independent 
individual is the essence of moral values, and the ethic of community, in which the group and 
social cohesion are the major concerns. In a similar vein, Schwartz (1994) found that intellectual 
autonomy (curiosity, open mindedness, creativity) and affective autonomy (pleasure, exciting 
life) are prioritized in societies based on independent social relations. On the other hand, 
security, conformity, and tradition are prioritized in societies based on interdependent social 
relations.  
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In addition, it has become widely accepted that identity is not a fixed entity, but rather a 
dynamic structure through interacting with social contexts (Higgins, 1987). In order to interact 
with social contexts, individuals need to be aware of the different roles and expectations 
prescribed by each context (e.g., family, school, and community). From this perspective, 
individuals’ moral identities across different contexts can be seen as flexible in how they manage 
their interpersonal relationships. According to Markus and Kitayama (1991), in more collectivist 
cultures (such as China), value is placed on adjusting behavior to fit the demands of in-group 
members. In these cultures, relationships maybe viewed as more flexible across different social 
contexts. In particular, Miller and Bersoff (1992) and Shweder et al., (1987) implied that Indians 
placed more similar moral demands across different social relationships (family members, 
friends, and ingroup strangers) than Americans. They found that Indians more frequently viewed 
responsiveness to another’s needs as a moral duty that extends across a broader range of social 
relationships. In contrast,Americans judged that the responsibility to help was weakerwhen the 
relationship involved low personal affinity (Miller, 2007). This result provides insight into 
context-differentiation cross-culturally, suggesting that Indians viewed social relationships as 
more fluid and interconnected.In turn they were less likely to separate types of social contexts 
with regard to their moral demands than Americans. This line of research has been supported in 
the area of interpersonal moral obligation between Indians and Americans; however, no previous 
studies investigated moral identities in relation to social contexts among other countries. In the 
current study, it was expected that people in China woulddemonstrate a less separated morality 
across different social contexts (less differentiated/more interrelated across contexts). In contrast, 
Canada places primary importance on forming personal attributes, which leads to an effort to 
maintain an independent self-concept that reflects independence from different types of 
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relationships. Thus, their views of moral demands should be more differentiated across social 
contexts.  
Measurement of Moral Identity and Culture 
 Previous research on moral identity has been mostly based either on trait or social-
cognitive approaches (Lapsley & Hill, 2009; Monin & Jordan, 2009). Trait-based approaches 
assume dispositions as mostrelevant to individuals’ moral conduct. Socio-cognitive approaches, 
by contrast, emphasize the malleability of situation-specific knowledge structures and schemas 
that guide self-regulation and action (Krettenauer, Murua, & Jia, 2016). However, neither trait 
norsocial-cognitive approaches consider contextual and especially cultural differences. Given the 
previous discussion between moral identity and cultural norms, measures of moral identity need 
to be revised when investigating cultural differences.    
The first limitation of moral identity research that needs to be overcome in general relates 
to the definition of the moral domain (Krettenauer et al., 2016). Previous measures of moral 
identity used a narrow-ranged set of values that mostly focus on benevolence (e.g., 
caring,compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind). 
However, recent research in virtue ethics, character education, and political orientation has 
suggested that the moral domain needs to be broader than the issues of caring and fairness which 
are currently overrepresented in moral identity (Haidt, 2007). For example, Walker and Pitts 
(1998) found that the typology of a highly moral person included (a) principled and idealistic, (b) 
dependable and loyal, (c) has integrity, (d) caring–trustworthy, (e) fair, and (f) confident (c.f., 
Walker & Pitts, 1998, Table 2). Walker and Hennig (2004) also suggested that there were 
different sets of moral exemplars (brave, caring, and just). Haidt (2007) proposed five distinct 
moral foundations: care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and 
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sanctity/degradation. These results suggest that people may form multiple moral domains and 
call the field’s attention to this wider range of moral virtues to be included in moral identity 
research.  
The second limitation of moral identity research in a cross-cultural perspective relates to 
a risk of an ethnocentric bias in defining moral values in accordance with Western cultures. The 
description of Western moral values may fail to adequately generalize the values of other non-
Western cultures because Western moral values are limited to a Western understanding of 
morality. Because there is no previous cross-cultural study on moral identity, culturally unique 
moral values need to be generated through a comprehensive study on the variance of cultural-
specific moral identity.  
The third limitation of moral identity research in cross-cultural perspective relates to 
context. Based on an interactional view of identity (Erikson, 1980), identities should emphasize 
the transaction between certain personal variables and highly specific contextual settings. 
Personal variables and contextual variables are interactive, and thus descriptions of a highly 
moral person must be qualified by referring to local settings and contexts (Mischel, 1990). 
Furthermore, previous discussions have also indicated that individuals who are influenced by 
independent/interdependent self-construals may have different awareness when they interact 
with social contexts. In the present study, commonly used procedures in self-concept research 
(see Baird, Le, & Lucas, 2006; Donahue, Robins, Roberts, & John, 1993) were applied for 
assessing context differentiation in individuals’ moral identity. Participants were asked to rate 
the self-importance of moral values independently in three different social contexts (family, 
school, and community/society). The variability of ratings across contexts was then used as an 
indicator of cross-context differentiation of individuals’ moral identity. 
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Moral Values in Chinese Culture 
 China is commonly assumed to reflect a collectivistic culture fostering an interdependent 
self, even though social change in Chinese society might complicate this picture (Oyserman, 
Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). Confucian values of effortful and respectful learning (Tweed & 
Lehman, 2002) were employed in Chinese education during a long span of Chinese history. 
Consequently, for thousands of years, Chinese citizens were accustomed to giving, obeying and 
following authority in the society. Extended families with hierarchical relationships were also 
important in traditional Chinese society. Moreover in contemporary Chinese history, the Cultural 
Revolution in Communism swept the nation in the 1970s, driving Chinese to “nation-oriented” 
collectivism (Yao, 2000). A very popular Chinese analogy of the national value is “Chinese 
people are like bricks”, which means all people have the same functions and are willing to be 
assigned wherever needed by the society (Yao, 2000). Thus, Chinese people should attribute 
national and societal level meanings to the concept of a highly moral person, based on the moral 
ideology that the nation is the most basic and important collective. 
 However, the processes of industrialization and modernization in China have prompted 
young people to be more mobile and independent, adopting a more individualistic lifestyle with a 
smaller family size (Chen, Bond, & Tang, 2007). A cross-generational study shows that younger 
generations in China are more individualistic than older ones: they are more likely to live 
according to their own lifestyles and less likely to follow the traditional collective ideology (Sun 
& Wang, 2010). During this period of social change, it has become important for children to 
acquire the individualistic values of achievement, self-reliance and autonomy (Sun & Wang, 
2010). In addition, Helwig, Arnold, Tan, and Boyd (2007) investigated moral judgments and 
reasoning between Chinese urban, rural adolescents and urban Canadian adolescents. They found 
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that Chinese adolescents from both urban and rural settings preferred a democratic system such 
as personal freedom of voice, transparency of political decision making, and concepts of political 
autonomy, justice and fairness (Helwig, et al., 2007). Educators in China now encourage parents 
to help children develop individualistic skills that are adaptive in a market-oriented society: self-
expression, self-direction, self-confidence (Yu, 2002). The traditionally valued characteristic of 
shyness is becoming a non-adaptive characteristic for Chinese children, as urbanization 
encourages people to be outgoing and express themselves (Chen, Wang, & Wang, 2009). 
 As a consequence of the rapid societal change, Chinese people need to adapt themselves 
to new ways of living a moral life. During the course of this shift, what happens to their moral 
values, and identities? Is an individualistic view of moral identity stepping onto the stage? In 
order to answer this broad question, the present study investigated moral identities in China and 
their relationship to Western moral identities in Canada.  
The Present Study 
 In the previous sections, we discussed general expectations regarding self-construals 
related to cultural differences in moral identity, along with modifications in conceptualization 
and measurement that are required when approaching moral identity from a cross-cultural 
perspective. As a potential solution, we tested a broader range of culturally inclusive moral 
values in our Study I. In Study II, we implemented this list of culturally inclusive moral values to 
demonstrate how cultural orientations influence the individual’s conceptualization of moral 
identity in the following aspects: (1) the value-domains that define individuals’ moral identity; 
(2) the moral identity in each context (family, school, and community/society); and (3) cross-
context differentiation.  
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 (1) Based on the well documented finding that the interdependence items, such as 
communion with others, concern for family and close others, fulfilling duties, conformity and 
responsibilities to in-groups, are more relevant for individuals who stress interdependence, it is 
reasonable to assume that collectivist cultures such as China should endorse Tradition, Security, 
and Conformity domains of moral identities in Schwartz’ circumplex model as defining a moral 
person more strongly than in individualist cultures such as Canada.  
 (2) Moral identities (regardless of value domains) were also expected to be different 
across cultures with regard to social contexts. According to the previous discussion on the 
interdependent self and Chinese Confucianism which concluded that Chinese tend to prioritize 
social harmony and “nation-oriented” collectivism, in turn, they should view moral identity as 
more important in the context of community/society than other contexts. In contrast, previous 
studies on interpersonal responsibility suggested that people from Western cultures viewed moral 
demands as more affected by personal affinity (Miller & Bersoff, 1998). Therefore, it was 
expected that Canadians should view moral identity as more important when relationships 
become more salient to their center of personal affinity. Thus, mean levels of moral identity 
should be most important in the context of the family, and should be the least important in the 
context of community/society in Canadian participants. 
 (3) Cross-context differentiation in moral identity refers to the degree to which an 
individual’s identity is varied across personally important contexts. Some people view social 
contexts as less separable and independent of whether they are with friends, with colleagues, or 
with family members. Other people seem to act in a more differentiated way, depending on the 
context. Based on a cultural analysis of self-construal ininteraction with social contexts, it was 
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expected that Chinese should have less cross-context differentiation (less separable/more 
interrelated in different contexts) in moral identities than Canadian participants. 
Method 
Participants 
The sample included 185 Canadians (63 male) and 148 (69 male) Chinese 1
st
 -2
nd
 year 
university students. The Canadian participants ranged in age from 18.00 to 25.83 years (Mage = 
19.59, SD = 1.46).The Chinese participants ranged in age from 17.50 to 24.00 years (Mage = 
20.04, SD = 1.30). The majority of Canadian participants (n = 146; 79%) identified themselves 
as European Canadian (e.g., Canadian-German, -Serbian, -Scottish), 18.3% identified themselves 
as Indian and South Asians,and 2.7 % identified themselves as African Canadians. The majority 
of Canadian participants were born in Canada (n = 162, 87.6%). For people who were born 
outside of Canada, their average time of living in Canada was 13.34 years (ranged from 4 to 21 
years; SD = 4.52). Due to their self-identification and length of living in Canada, we included 
these participants who were not born in Canada in the Canadian sample. All Chinese participants 
were born in China.  
For the Canadian sample, university participants were students of introductory 
psychology classes who received course credit for their participation. For the Chinese sample, 
Chinese university participants were recruited from first year Introductory Psychology at 
Northern-East Normal University in Chang Chun. Northern-East Normal University is an 
educational and research institution. Students who graduated in psychology from Northern-East 
Normal University mostly become teachers or researchers. Each Chinese participant received 20 
Chinese Yuan (CAN$ 4) after participating in the survey. After providing informed consent, 
participants were required to complete a questionnaire.  
MORAL IDENTITY AND CULTURE                                                                                     46 
 
Measures and Procedure 
Moral Identity. Canadian participants were asked to fill out an online questionnaire 
assessing individuals’ moral identity. Chinese participants were asked to fill out a paper-pencil 
version of the questionnaire in classes. Materials in the questionnaire were based on a 
modification of an interview version of moral identity (Krettenauer et al., 2016). This 
questionnaire included (a) moral values which individuals used to define their personal moral 
identity, and (b) the context-specific assessment of moral identity. In the present study, 
participants were asked to define their moral identity by choosing from a larger list of values that 
were generated in the preliminary studies. These values were taken to assess the self-importance 
of morality separately in three different social contexts: family, school and community/society.  
Participants were given a culturally inclusive list of 90 moral values to describe a highly 
moral person (from Study I). Attributes included in the present study covered a broad range of 
values, from being dependable (e.g., sincere, honest, reliable) and caring (e.g., generous, helpful, 
selfless) to concerns for fairness and tolerance (e.g., being accepting, open-minded, fair) and 
conformity (e.g., law abiding). To familiarize participants with all values, they were first asked 
to rate all 90 values according to how well they describe a highly moral person using a 5-point 
scale from 1 = not at all to 5 = extremely well. Participants were then asked to select those 12 to 
15 values according to their own personal viewthat defined “the core of a highly moral person”. 
The remainder of the questionnaire was based on those 12-15 values that individuals had selected 
for themselves to define a highly moral person. 
To assess the self-importance of the chosen attributes, participants were asked to create 
pictorial self-portraits similar to the method developed by Harter and Monsour (1992) when 
assessing context-specificities in individuals’ self-concepts. Participants were given a diagram 
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that displayed four nested circles representing varying levels of self-importance. Participants 
were instructed to rate each value according to its level of importance to the self (from 1 =not 
important at the outer periphery to 5 = extremely importantat the center of the diagram). There 
were three diagrams with different headings, one representing the social context of family (“How 
important is it for you to be ____ in the context of your family?”), school (“How important is it 
for you to be ____ in the context of school?”) and community/the larger society (“How 
important is it for you to be ____ in the context of your community and the larger society?”).  
Participants worked on the three diagrams consecutively. Ordering of the diagrams was 
randomized. Based on this procedure, various statistical indices were calculated. These indices 
reflect (a) the relative importance of different value domains for defining a person’s moral 
identity, (b) the mean levels of an individual’s moral identity with regard to context specificity, 
and (c) cross-context differentiation.  
Value domains defining moral identities.  Schwartz’s circumplex model was employed 
as an analytical tool (for details, see Study Ic) to assess what values defined a person’s moral 
identity. A total of 13 value domains that made up the list of 90 value attributes was used in the 
present study (for a full list of all value attributes and their categorizations, see Table 2). 
According to the Krettenauer et al. (2016) procedure to assess individuals’ personal moral 
identity, I counted how often participants chose a particular value domain as very important to 
the self in the three social contexts. These scores were divided by the total number of attributes 
that were considered as very important across three contexts by the participants and then 
multiplied by 100, yielding a percentage score of the relative importance of each value domain 
for defining a person’s moral identity. The average percentage score in a particular value domain 
indicated the percentage of values that were considered very important to the self in the domain.   
MORAL IDENTITY AND CULTURE                                                                                     48 
 
Mean level of moral identity. In order to assess a mean level of an individual’s moral 
identity with regard to context specificity, self-importance ratings of the selected values (1 = not 
important to 5 = extremely important) were averaged in each context. Averaged score across the 
three contexts was also used as an overall moral identity regardless of the context in this study. 
Internal consistency for this scale was .85. Inter-item correlationsamong three contexts ranged 
from .58 to .67 in Canadian cultureand from .64 to .82 in Chinese culture. 
Cross-context differentiation of moral identity. Cross-context differentiation of moral 
identity was assessed by calculating standard deviations across social contexts for each value 
chosen by the participant. According to the procedure proposed by Baird et al. (2006), each item 
(total 90 value items) standard deviation was regressed on the item mean. In general, when 
variables are skewed, variability scores and means tend to be highly correlated. In the present 
study, the correlation between item means and item standard deviation was significant, r = -.53, 
p< .01. Thus, standardized residuals were computed using linear regression that each item’s 
standard deviation was regressed on each item mean to represent the extent to which a person 
with a given mean on a given item has a high or low standard deviation relative to other 
individuals with the same mean on that item (Baird et al., 2006). This score reflects cross-context 
differentiation in moral identity independent of mean-level. 
Results 
Investigating the hypotheses as outlined across culture, we considered (a) the relative 
importance of value domains that define a person’s moral identity, (b) the mean level of moral 
identity in each social context, and (c) cross-context differentiation were analyzed. We addressed 
topics (a) to (c) in three separate sets of analyses. 
Preliminary Analyses: Moral Identity, Age, and Gender 
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An overall mean level of moral identity was not correlated with age (in years) in either 
culture, r (182) = -.01, p = .90 in Canadian participants; r (135) = -.14, p = .10 in Chinese 
participants. However, there is a low negative correlation between mean levels of moral identity 
in the community/large society context and age in the Chinese sample r (131) = -.18, p = .04. 
Cross-context differentiation of moral identity (controlled for mean level) was not correlated 
with age in either Canadian or Chinese culture, r = .06, p = .38, and r =.12, p = .15 respectively.  
Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) with culture and gender as predictors was 
conducted to explore gender differences. There was no main effect of gender, F (3, 323) = 2.52, 
p = .058, ɳ² = .02. There was a significant interaction between culture and gender, F (3, 323) = 
4.50, p = .004, ɳ² = .04. Chinese male participants scored higher than Canadian male participants 
on the mean level of moral identity, regardless of contexts (see Table 4). In the context of school, 
and community/society, Chinese male participants scored significantly higher than Canadian 
male participants, ps< .01, but not in the context of family (p = .08).  
Main Analyses 
Value domains defining moral identities and culture.Based on the Schwartz et 
al.(2012) categorizations, the 13 value domains that made up the list of 90 value attributes were 
classified. How often participants chose a particular value domain as very important to the self in 
the three social contexts of family, school, or community/society was counted. These scores were 
divided by the overall number of attributes that were considered as very important across all 
three contexts and multiplied by 100, yielding a percentage score of the relative importance of 
each value domain for defining a person’s moral identity. In the Canadian sample, on average 
30.06% of the value attributes that were considered very important belonged to the domain of 
Benevolence-dependability (e.g., genuine, honest, reliable), followed by Universalism-tolerance 
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at 24.08% (e.g., accepting, non-judgmental, understanding), Benevolence-caring at 9%, (e.g. 
generous, helpful, kind), whereas the percentages of all other value domains were lower than 4%. 
Unclassified values presented 14.71%.  
In the Chinese sample, on average 18.41% of the value attributes that were considered 
very important belonged to the domain of Benevolence-dependability, followed by Benevolence-
caring at 11.92%, and Universalism-tolerance at 10.02%. Moreover, Chinese participants viewed 
Conformity-interpersonal (9.82%), Security (9%), Self-direction (6.01%), Humble (5.89%), and 
Tradition (5.45%)as important to define a moral person. The percentages of Universalism-
concern, Conformity-rules, Achievement, Hedonism, and Face in the Chinese sample were lower 
than 5%. Unclassified values presented 8.55%. 
Table 5 illustrates the average percent of attributes chosen by participants as very 
important to define moral identity in the three contexts in each culture. With regard to cultural 
similarities, the top three value domains defining moral identities in both cultures were 
Benevolence-dependability, Universalism-tolerance, and Benevolence-caring. This indicated that 
both Benevolence and Universalism-tolerance value domains were at the core of defining a 
moral person universally in Chinese and Canadian cultures. With regard to cultural differences, 
Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) with culture as a main factor was conducted. 
There was a significant main effect of culture, F (13, 182) = 7.81, p< .01, ɳ² = .36.  Table 6 
illustrates significant level for each value domain across cultures. Canadian participants scored 
significantly higher than Chinese participants in the value domains of Benevolence-dependability 
and Universalism-tolerance. Chinese participants scored significantly higher than Canadian 
participants consistently in the value domains of Conformity-interpersonal, Security, Self-
direction, Hedonism, and Tradition.  
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Although not anticipated, analyses of these value orientations in moral identity afforded 
interesting insights by unpacking cultural differences in the value domain of Security. For 
example, moral values of patriotic, solidaric, prudent and careful were frequently mentioned by 
Chinese participants in addition to the Western understanding of Security as clean and healthy. 
In addition to healthy and clean, four additional Chinese unique attributes (patriotic, solidaric, 
prudent, and careful) were added into the domain in the previous Study I. In the present study, 
Chinese participants were more likely than Canadian participants to select the attributes of 
patriotic (50 times vs. once) and solidaric (21 times vs. once) as very important in defining a 
highly moral person in three contexts than Canadian participants.  
Mean level of moral identity and culture. Multivariate Analysis of Variance 
(MANOVA) with 3 contexts (family, school and community/society) as the within-subject 
factor, 2 cultures (Chinese and Canadian) and 2 genders as the between subject factors was 
conducted to test cultural differences in the mean level of moral identity with regard to context 
specificity. Significant main effects were found for context, F (2, 648) = 3.74, p = .024, ɳ2= .011; 
and culture F (1, 324) = 5.41, p = .012, ɳ2= .013. An independent t test (t = 2.26, p = .02) 
revealed that Chinese participants (M = 4.23, SD = .50) scored higher overall on mean level of 
moral identity regardless of contexts than Canadian participants (M = 4.08, SD = .56). However, 
this result needs to be considered in the context of the significant interaction between context and 
culture, F (2, 326) = 10.57, p< .01, ɳ2= .061. Post hoc t tests revealed that there were cultural 
differences in the context of school(t = 2.89, p< .01) and community/society (t = 3.52, p< .01), 
but not in the context of family (t = .28, p = .78). Means and standard deviations in each culture 
and context are presented in Table 7. The results indicated that Chinese persons scored higher on 
mean levels of moral identity in the context of school and the context of community/society than 
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Canadian participants. The interactions between context and gender or context, gender and 
culture were not significant. Within each culture, paired sample t tests revealed that Chinese 
participants scored highest in the context of community/society, following by the context of 
school and family (ps< .01); in contrast, Canadian participants scored higher in the context of 
family than in the context of school (p< .01) and the context of community/society (p = .046), 
but there was no significant difference between the context of school and community/society (p 
= .22).  
Cross-context differentiation of moral identity and culture. According to Baird et 
al’s. (2006) statistical procedure, an averaged standardized residual score was generated to 
reflect the cross-context differentiation in moral identity. Thus, a larger standardized residual 
score means more variability/differentiation, whereas a smaller standardized residual indicates 
less context-differentiation. As expected, Chinese participants (M = -.25, SD = .86) scored 
significantly lower in cross-context differentiation (standardized residual) than Canadian 
participants (M = .21, SD = 1.06). Independent t-tests indicated that Chinese participants’ moral 
identities on average were less differentiated across the three contexts than Canadian 
participants, t (326) = 4.28, p< .01, but gender was not a significant factor, t (326) = 1.87, p =06.  
Discussion 
 The main goal of the present studies was to refine the theoretical conceptualization and 
the measurement of moral identity from a cross-cultural perspective. Even though a few studies 
have examined cultural differences in moral reasoning (Gibbs et al., 2007), moral domains 
(Shweder et al., 1997), moral foundations (Graham, et al., 2011), and moral emotions 
(Krettenauer & Jia, 2013), no published research of which we are aware has directly investigated 
cultural differences in a Western and an Eastern sample in moral identity. In the present research, 
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moral identity was conceptualized and assessed as a context dependent self-structure which can 
entail a broad range of value-orientations and is more or less differentiated in both culture 
groups. Based on this conceptualization, we adopted a new measure of moral identity which 
included a context specific assessment (Krettenauer et al., 2016) and a culturally inclusive range 
of value-orientations (Study I).  
 In the present research, Schwartz’s circumplex model was employed as an analytical tool 
to assess what values defined a person’s moral identity. A total of 13 value domains were 
classified from the list of 90 value attributes: Benevolence-dependability, Benevolence-caring, 
Universalism-tolerance, Universalism-concern, Self-direction, Conformity-rules, Conformity-
interpersonal, Achievement, Face, Tradition, Hedonism, Humble, and Security. Our findings are 
consistent with previous work that found morality in general is defined in terms of welfare and 
fairness concerns (Schwartz, 1992). In both cultural groups, Benevolence-dependability, 
Universalism-tolerance, and Benevolence-caring were selected and rated as the cores of defining 
a moral person. In addition to the core of moral identities, Chinese participants defined a highly 
moral person more broadly, including other domains such as Conformity-interpersonal, Security, 
Self-direction, Humble, and Tradition. Virtue ethics, character education, and ethical codes of 
non-Western cultures suggest that it is necessary to broaden the moral domain to include issues 
other than welfare and fairness (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001).  
 Consistent with our cross-cultural expectations about moral value-orientations, Chinese 
endorsed more conservation oriented domains of moral identities such as Tradition, Security, and 
Conformity-interpersonal than Canadians. This result is supported by past self-construal theorists 
(e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991) that found interdependent individuals value higher modesty 
and more relational identities than independent individuals. In addition, those domains are 
MORAL IDENTITY AND CULTURE                                                                                     54 
 
regarded as the core moral quality in Confucianism that one should be responsible to one’s 
primary group (e.g., family, political party, and religious party) and one’s society and country 
(Yao, 2000). A highly moral person should stand up to defend the interests of the group when the 
group is facing crisis or threats at the expense of one’s personal interest (Yao, 2000). Moreover, 
Chinese participants also showed independent aspects of moral identities such as Self-direction 
with the process of globalization. This result is supported by previous studies that Chinese 
preferred a democratic political system (Helwig, et al., 2007), and Chinese studentswere 
encouraged to develop individualistic skills that are adaptive in a market-oriented society (Yu, 
2002). 
 Previous moral identity research has largely neglected context-specificity and role 
relations of moral identities. Individuals’ moral identities are greatly impacted and influenced by 
the social context around them (Erikson, 1980). The process of socialization such as norms, 
customs, and ideologies typically begins within the family and extends to other agents, including 
education, religion, peer groups and social/cultural norms (Hart & Atkins, 2002). The present 
study provided cross-cultural evidence that people from different cultures hold unique views of 
defining their moral identity separately in the contexts of family, school, and community/society. 
It was found that Chinese participants rated the mean level of moral identity most importantly in 
the context of community/society; Canadian participants rated the mean level of moral identity 
most importantly in the context of family. These findings suggested Chinese are more likely to 
conceptualize moral identity as citizenship, which is related to national identity and national 
patriotism according to Confucianism. As a socially and civically responsible citizen, a highly 
moral person should have the obligations to obey the law, and to respect the rights, traditions, 
and customs of other people in the nation (Yao, 2000). Thus, love of one’s country including its 
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history, culture, tradition and values formed a more important basis of conceptualizing moral 
identity in China. It is also worth noting that there was no significant cultural difference on the 
mean level of morality in the context of family. This indicated that both cultures viewed the 
context of family as a core conceptualization of their moral identity. Thus, family context plays a 
major role in the structure of moral identity based on their ideal of what qualities should be 
important for their own lives.  
 Moreover, the present study found that Chinese male participants scored higher on the 
mean level of moral identity than Chinese female participants. But there was no gender 
difference in the Canadian sample. This result may be explained by the only child policy in 
China. The only child policy is a special phenomenon as a result of the population control in 
China. Since Chinese families can only have one child, most of them hope to have a boy instead 
of a girl. Boys are often expected to have higher academic achievement, and receive more 
emotional,educational, and financial supports from their parents than girls (Deutsch, 2006). Only 
child sons might be more likely to internalize parental values than daughters and the sons also 
bear the entire responsibility for their family’s welfare (Deutsch, 2006). The one child policy 
seems to be criticized in terms of gender equality from Western feminists.   
 In addition, most research on moral identity has conceptualized consistency in terms of 
stability across contexts, ignoring the possibility that moral identity can exhibit different levels of 
internalization across contexts and cultures. However, past cross-cultural researchers (e.g., Ji, 
Peng, & Nisbett, 2000) have postulated that independent individuals tend to engage in an 
analytic thinking style, focusing on attributes in the field without much consideration of their 
context or even independently of context. In contrast, interdependent individuals value higher 
relational identities or view the world holistically. They tend to view different social roles as 
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interrelated and flexible in relation to each other. Our results cohere with prior research in 
cultural differences in the degree of malleability in social contexts, but go further by explicitly 
testing cross-context differentiations of moral identities in each cultural group. Our key finding 
was that Canadian participants’ moral identities on average were more differentiated (less 
interrelated) across the three contexts than Chinese participants. That is, Canadians’ 
conceptualization of moral identity was more personalized to specific relationship contexts, 
which reflected individuals’ more distinctive moral values dependent on the social context.  
 The present study had several limitations that should be noted. A major limitation of the 
study is the two-culture comparison design. As such, it is not possible to examine the extent to 
which moral identities were conceptualized in other ethnic groups within Canadian and Chinese 
cultures. Thus, two-culture comparisons can be significantly improved by using individual and 
subgroup differences to measure moral identity in future research. Moreover, because of the two-
culture comparisons, it would be an oversimplification to assume that the independence-
interdependence distinction always takes the same form in Chinese and Canadian cultures. 
Generalization of the findings in the present study should be interpreted with caution. Thirdly, it 
would also be useful to test our hypotheses using additional contexts, as there maybe 
idiosyncratic differences in the relationship for which people elaborate context specific views of 
moral identity (English & Chen, 2007). There might not be cultural differences in moral 
identities across less important relationships such as acquaintances or out-group members. In 
addition, Canadian data were collected in a web-based setting. Although online research has a 
number of advantages, including saving time and money, extrapolating to underrepresented 
samples, and generating creative methods and measurements (Skitka & Sargis, 2005), a number 
of limitations have been identified. For example, errors may occur due to uncontrolled contextual 
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features such as a distracting environment with the presence of others (Skitka & Sargis, 2005). 
Finally, the sample of the present study included only university students and excluded other age 
groups. With age, people from different cultures diverge in their psychological and social 
experiences. Developmental patterns of cultural differences should be investigated in future 
research. 
 Despite these limitations, the present study provided cross-cultural evidence that moral 
identity is a context-dependent structure which includes a broad range of value orientations. 
Moral identity consists of multiple components and individuals differ systematically and cross-
culturally in the degree to which their moral identities are defined and differentiated from each 
other rather than integrated into a unitary identity. Most importantly, the present study illustrated 
how cultural orientations influence the individual’s conceptualization of moral identity.   
Study III 
In the previous studies, cultural similarities and differences in moral identity between 
Canada and China were investigated. In Study III, a new cultural group, Chinese Canadians, was 
added to expand the investigation of how culture orientation impacts moral identities. This study 
explored the question to what degree and under which circumstances do Chinese Canadians’ 
moral identity patterns become more similar to the moral identity of the majority group of their 
country. Although there is a large body of research on Chinese immigrants in Canada (e.g., 
Berry, Phinney, Sam, & Vedder, 2006; Ryder, Alden, & Paulhus, 2000; Jia, Gottardo, Chen, 
Koh, & Pasquarella, 2016), most of the research has been concerned with language proficiency, 
health outcomes and acculturation strategies. To date, there has been little focus on the 
acculturation of moral identity, which just like other types of psychological outcomes, may 
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consist of changes and eventual outcomes that result from a person’s encounters with another 
culture (Berry & Sam, 1997).  
Cultural variations in moral identities may be particularly salient in a context of bicultural 
society. Adapting to a new identity and cultural environment are challenges for immigrants. 
Many immigrants modify their own values to conform more to those that prevail in their new 
home country. At school, immigrant adolescents and young adults feel pressured to adopt the 
culture of their new home country. As a result, they may focus on the achievement aspect of 
identity formation in order to be successful in the new environment. At home, they may 
encounter a different environment that reflects the values and traditions of their country of 
origin. Thus, they may maintain their traditional values and identity in family practices (Knafo & 
Schwartz, 2001). Moreover, immigrant adolescents and young adults may wish to communicate 
values from their country of origin that resemble values in the new culture. If these value 
systems differ, they must choose between the two value systems or find a unique way to 
integrate the two contradictory identities (Berry, 1990).  
 Most cross-cultural studies have contrasted people from two distinct cultures, but some of 
this research has also included samples of bicultural groups that are intermediate to the two 
cultures under study. For example, Chinese-Canadians comprisea group that has exposure to 
both mainstream European American culture and their family’s traditional Asian culture. It 
follows that such individuals should demonstrate ways of thinking intermediate to that of 
European-Canadian and Chinese samples. In general these studies have investigated these three 
cultural groups, on a wide variety of measures relevant to the self.The most common pattern of 
findings is evidence for blending: that is, the bicultural sample shows a pattern somewhere 
between the two-monoculture samples. For example, Heine and Lehman (2004) investigated 
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what happens to self-esteem when one moves from a culture that tends to have lower rates of 
self-esteem to a culture that tends to have higher rates. They measured the self-esteem of 
Japanese exchange students living in Canada at two time points: a few days after they arrived in 
Canada, and then 7 months later. The results revealed that Japanese students’self-esteem scores 
were significantly higher after they had been in Canada for a while than when they had just 
arrived. 
 In a follow-up study, Heine and Lehman (2004) also compared the self-esteem of several 
thousand students in Japan and Canada. This large group of students was divided into 
subsamples with regard to their exposure to North American culture. In order to 
investigateincreases in exposure to North American culture, these categories were 1) Japanese 
who had never been outside Japan, 2) Japanese who had spent some time in a Western country, 
3) recent Japanese immigrants to Canada (less than 7 years), 4)Japanese who immigrated to 
Canada more than 7 yearspreviously, 5) second-generation Japanese Canadians, 6) Third-
generation Japanese Canadians and finally 7) European Canadians. They found that the longer 
those of Japanese descent had spent in North American culture, the higher their self-esteem 
scores. These studies suggest that levels of change in self-concept can be variedfrom 7 months to 
a long period of time. For Japanese Canadians, it appears to take them three generations to 
become fully acculturated with regard to their self-esteem. It remains to be studied; however, 
whether acculturative changes are as slow for people in other self-related psychological variables 
such as moral identity.  
 More recently, a longitudinal study with Chinese immigrants has observed that 
participants’ self-representation changed after exposure to Western culture for six months (Chen, 
Wagner, Kelley, & Heatherton, 2015). In their experiment, native Chinese recent immigrants 
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completed a trait-judgment task in which they judged whether a series of psychological traits 
applied to themselves and separately, whether these traits applied to their mother.Participants 
were then scanned in fMRI within 2 months of their arrival (Time 1), and 6 months after the 
initial scans (Time 2). According to self-construal theory, individuals from independent cultures 
view the self as a unique entity and as being independent from other individuals. Researchers 
found that for the Chinese immigrants who became more acculturated and less like Easterner, the 
self vs. mother differencewas found; whereas, for participants who wereless acculturated and 
more like Easterners, the self vs. mother difference was not found at in Time 2. The result 
supported the notion that self-construal changes during the process of acculturation in 
participants’ brain structures.  
 Cultural psychologists have offered an alternative explanation on how bicultural people 
change their self-identities. That is rather than each person’s sense of self being assimilated over 
time as new Western cultural experiences were slowly integratedin, it is possible that bicultural 
people can develop multiple selves, each prepared to deal with a specific cultural environment, 
without losing his or her heritage cultural identity or having to choose one culture over the other 
(LaFromboise, Coleman, & Gerton, 1993). For example, people exposed to Western culture 
would have a set of values about independence, confidence, freedom, and individual rights. 
These values are interdependent in the sense that they usually come in clusters. Thus, activating 
one construct that is part of a network should activate other constructs of the network 
(LaFromboise et al., 1993). In other words, Chinese Canadians would have an information 
network regarding Chinese values and ones regarding Canadian values. Hong and colleagues 
demonstrated Westernized Chinese students in Hong Kong who were exposed to bicultural 
worlds would have multiple information networks by asking participants to explain the behaviors 
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when they watched a video clip about “a single fish is swimming ahead of a group” (Hong, 
Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000). Then they manipulated the kinds of thoughts the HK 
Chinese were having by showing them a number of cultural icons (either Chinese pictures such 
as a dragon, the Great Wall or American pictures such as Mickey Mouse, The Statue of Liberty). 
They found that when the bicultural participants were primed with icons that reminded them of 
the different cultures, they could be led to think in ways that were more consistent with the 
culture (Hong, et al., 2000). Thus, this alternative view maintains that bicultural people develop 
mastery over both cultural worlds and develop divergent selves that can be selectively activated.  
 In Study III, I examined cultural differences of moral identities among Chinese 
Canadianswho constituted the bicultural group; European Canadians represented the mainstream 
standard of comparison; and Chinese in China constituted the heritage comparison. Chinese 
Canadians were selected because Chinese and Canadians’ moral identities have been shown to 
differ in the previous study. I adopted a cultural psychological perspective on acculturation in 
which psychological processes are seen as equally constitutive with cultural meanings and 
practice (Berry & Sam, 1997). In this view, contact with a new culture may be associated with 
changes in people’s moral values and identities, and may thus be a function of acculturation. 
Therefore, I expected that Chinese Canadians’ moral identities were more similar toEuropean 
Canadians moral identities than the moral identitiesof Chinese in China. In addition, length of 
residency, immigrant status, and mainstream acculturation were explored in relation to moral 
identity.   
Method 
Participants 
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The study included 427participants from the three cultural groups: 131 Chinese 
Canadians (54 male), 146 (51 male) European Canadians, and 148 (69 male) Chinese in China. 
The sample of Chinese-Canadian was recruited online from Wilfrid Laurier University, 
University of Waterloo, and University of Toronto. The sample of Chinese in Chinawas from 
Study II. The sample of European-Canadianswas selected from the Canadian participants in 
Study II if the participants identified themselves as European Canadians. Two steps were taken: 
All male European-Canadians were selected from Study II; Ninety five female European-
Canadians were randomly selected from Study II.  
The Chinese-Canadian participants ranged in age from 15.25 to 41.92 (Mage = 22.14, SD 
= 3.90); the European-Canadian participants ranged in age from 18.00 to 25.83 years (Mage = 
19.73, SD = 1.53); the Chinese participants ranged in age from 17.50 to 24.00 years (Mage = 
20.04, SD = 1.30). A large range of lengths of residence for the Chinese Canadians were 
included to capture variability in the immigration process. A majority of them (80.9%) were born 
in Mainland China and were presently living in medium-sized to large urban areas in southern 
Ontario. Their length of residence in Canada ranged from less than one year to 22 years, with an 
average length of 8.16 (SD = 6.45). Seventy-six of them (28 males) were recent short-term 
immigrants with a mean length of residency of 3.70 years (SD = 1.45), while 48 of the Chinese 
Canadians (22 males) were long-term immigrants with a mean length of residency of 15.25 years 
(SD = 4.78). The majority of European Canadian participants were born in Canada (92.5%). For 
people who were born outside of Canada, their average time of living in Canada was 14.75 years 
(ranged from 10 to 21 years; SD = 4.17). Due to their self-identification and length of residence 
in Canada, I included these participants who were not born in Canada in the European Canadian 
sample. All Chinese participants were born in China. 
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It is worthwhile to note that the present study intended to recruit Chinese-Canadians who 
have different immigrationstatus. Chinese-Canadian participants were definedas members of one 
of two immigrant statuses: recent immigrants who had been in Canada for 6 years or less, and 
long-term immigrants who had been in Canada for more than 7 years. This classification has 
been used in the literature of cultural identity and English proficiency (e.g., Jia, Gottardo, Koh, 
Chen, & Pasquarella, 2014); ethnic identity and health (e.g., Chiu, Austin, Maneul, &Tu, 2012); 
and bicultural identity (e.g., Chen & Bennet-Martinez, 2008). In addition,the group of long-term 
Chinese Canadiansalso included2
nd
 generation immigrants (n = 23 in the present study) whose 
parents were immigrants but they were born in Canada (e.g., Okazaki & Saw, 2011). 
Acculturation research typically includes second-generation immigrants because they live at the 
intersection of two cultures (Berry, 1997).  
Procedure 
All Chinese-Canadian participants were asked to fill out an online questionnaire assessing 
these individuals’ moral identities. The same procedure as in Study II was followed. In the 
present study, participants were asked to define their moral identity by choosing from a 
culturally inclusive list of values that were generated in the previous studies. These values were 
taken to assess the self-importance of morality separately in three different social contexts: 
family, school and community/society. Three major outcomes were followed as in Study II: 1) A 
mean level of each individual’s moral identity with regard to the context specificity; 2) A 
percentage score of the relative importance of each value domain for defining a person’s moral 
identity; 3) Cross-context differentiation of moral identity. In addition, a measure of 
acculturation was added into the Chinese-Canadian questionnaire.  
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Acculturation.The Vancouver Index of Acculturation (VIA) was used to assess 
acculturation in the Chinese-Canadian samples only (Ryder et al., 2000). This measure is 
consistent with a bi-dimensional model of acculturation in which it is possible to maintain ties to 
one’s heritage culture while endorsing the “new” mainstream culture (Ryder et al., 2000). The 20 
items in the VIA measured attitudes in the following 10 domains: cultural traditions, 
marriage/partner, social activities, level of comfort working with people, entertainment, behavior, 
practices, values, humor, and friends. Participants rated each item on a 9-point Likert scale that 
ranged from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (9). Higher scores on the mainstream 
dimension reflected greater attitudes towards the individual’s mainstream cultural setting, and 
were labeled as Mainstream acculturation. Internal consistency as assessed by Cronbach’s alpha 
was .88 for the mainstream dimension and .90 for the heritage dimension in the present study. 
A demographic questionnaire was included to assess age, gender, major in university, 
parents’ educational levels, and ethnicity. For the Chinese-Canadian and European-Canadian 
samples, two additional questions were asked to assess participants’ birth countries and their 
length of residence in Canada if they were born outside Canada.  
Results 
To explore moral identities in a bicultural group, a) mean level of moral identity in each 
social context, b) value domains defining moral identitiesacrosscontexts, and c)cross-context 
differentiation were analyzed by comparing Chinese Canadians, the bicultural group, with 
European Canadians and Chinese in China as the two monocultural groups. 
Preliminary analyses.Overall, on the measure of acculturation, the mainstream 
acculturation subscale had an average score of 5.20 (SD = .80) and the heritage enculturation 
subscale had an average score of 5.54 (SD = .84). A paired samples t - test indicated that 
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Chinese-Canadian recent immigrants tended to be enculturated in their heritage culture more 
than acculturating in mainstream culture, t (63) = -5.98, p< .01. For long-term Chinese-Canadian 
immigrants, there were no differences in their acculturation patterns, t (41) = -.12, p = .91.Means 
and standard deviations are presented in Table 7. There was a positive correlation between 
heritage enculturation and mainstream acculturation, r(112) = .45, p < .01 which represented a 
bicultural identity in the Chinese-Canadian sample. A positive correlation between mainstream 
acculturation and heritage has also been found previously from a sample of Chinese-Canadian 
adolescents (e.g., Jia et al., 2014). It suggests that getting closer to the dominant society is not 
necessarily achieved by separating from one’s heritage group. 
Overall mean level of moral identity wasnot correlated with age (in years), r (127) = -.04, 
p= .69, gender, r (129) =.10, p= .28, or immigrant status, r (129) = -.12, p= .20. However, there 
was a moderate negative correlation between mean level of moral identity in the school context 
and immigrant status, r (119) = -.19, p= .05. Recent Chinese-Canadian immigrants scored higher 
on moral identity than long-term Chinese-Canadian immigrants in the context of school, F(1, 
117) = 3.86, p= .052, but not in the contexts of family, F (1, 120) = .01, p= .91, or 
community/society, F (1, 121) = 1.40, p= .24. 
Mean level of moral identity. Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) with 3 
contexts (family, school and community/society) as the within-subject factor, and 3 cultures 
(European Canadians, Chinese and Chinese Canadians) as the between-subject factor was 
conducted to test cultural differences in the mean level of moral identity. A significant main 
effect was found for culture, F (2,411) = 8.11, p < .01, ɳ2= .038; but not for context, F (2, 822) = 
2.06, p = .13, ɳ2= .005. Post hoc Bonferroni corrections revealed that Chinese Canadians 
significantly differed from Chinese in China (p< .01) on the mean-level of moral identity but no 
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differences with European Canadians were found (p = .39). There was a significant interaction 
between context and culture, F (4, 822) = 8.97, p< .01, ɳ2= .042. 
ANOVA revealed that there were cultural differences in the context of school, F (2, 411) 
= 7.95, p < .01, ɳ2= .037, and community/society, F (2, 411) = 16.51, p < .01, ɳ2= .074, but not 
in the context of family, F (2, 411) = .61, p=.54, ɳ2= .003. Means and standard deviations in each 
culture and context are presented in Table 9. Post hoc Bonferroni corrections revealed that 
Chinese Canadians significantly differed from Chinese in China in the context of school and the 
context of community (ps< .01) on the mean-level of moral identity, but no difference with 
European Canadians in the context of school or in the context of community (ps> .05). 
Meandifferences in each context are presented in Table 10. The results indicated that Chinese 
Canadians mean levels of moral identity were more similar to European Canadians than Chinese 
in China.  
Value domains defining moral identities and culture.Based on Schwartz’s (2012) 
categorizations, 13 value domains that made up the list of 90 value attributes were classified. The 
same procedure as in Study II was used to calculate average percent of attributes chosen by 
participants as very important to defining moral identity.  
Table 11 illustrates average percentages of attributes chosen by participants as very 
important for defining moral identity in the three contexts in each culture. With regard to cultural 
similarities, the top three value domains defining moral identities in all three cultures were 
Benevolence-dependability, Universalism-tolerance, and Benevolence-caring. This indicated that 
both Benevolence and Universalism-tolerance value domains were the cores of defining a moral 
person in all three cultural groups. The percentages of all other value domains were lower than 
5% in the European-Canadian sample. In contrast, Chinese participants viewed Conformity-
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interpersonal (9.82%), Security (9%), Self-direction (6.01%), Humble (5.89%), and Tradition 
(5.45%)as still important to define a moral person. Chinese Canadians selected Conformity-rule 
(6.29%) and Universalism-concern (5.40%) as still important to define a moral person in 
addition to the core of moral identities such as Benevolence (43.17%) and Universalism-
tolerance (13.51%). The percentages of all other value domains were lower than 5% in the 
Chinese-Canadian sample. There wasa lower percentage of unclassified values in the Chinese 
sample (8.55%) than the Chinese-Canadian sample (13.33%) and the European-Canadian sample 
(14.55%).  
To investigate if Chinese Canadians’ moral identity in each domain was more like the 
European Canadians than the Chinese in China, Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) 
with culture as a predictor was conducted. There was a significant main effect of culture, F (26, 
418) = 4.21, p < .01, ɳ² = .21. Post hoc tests with Bonferroni corrections revealed that Chinese 
Canadians’ average percentages of values defining a highly moral person were significantly 
different from Chinese in China in the domains of Benevolence-dependable (p = .028), Self-
direction (p = .022), Security (p = .001), and Tradition (p = .005). However, there were no 
significant difference between Chinese Canadians and European Canadians in all domains (ps> 
.05). Figure 3 illustrates the pattern in each domain across the three cultural groups. 
The impact of immigrant status on average percentages of attributes selected to define a 
moral person in each domain was explored in the Chinese-Canadian sample. Multivariate 
Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) with immigrant statuses (recentN= 76or long-termN= 48) as a 
predictor was conducted. There was no significant effect of immigrant status, F(12, 34) = 1.16, p 
= .35. Follow-up independentt-tests indicated that there wasa significant difference in the domain 
of Conformity-rule, t (45) = 2.08, p = .045, and a moderate difference in the domain of 
MORAL IDENTITY AND CULTURE                                                                                     68 
 
Universalism-concern, t (45) = -1.91, p = .06. Recent Chinese-Canadian immigrants selected 
more attributes in the domain of Conformity-rule than long-term immigrants (9.49% vs. .48%). 
Long-term immigrants selected more attributes in the domain of Universalism-concern than 
recent immigrants (11.53% vs. 3.41%).Table 13 illustrates average percentages of attributes 
chosen by participants as very important for defining moral identity in the three contexts in each 
immigrant status. 
Acculturation and moral identity among Chinese-Canadian immigrants. A multiple 
regression analysis was conducted to further determine whether length of residency, immigrant 
status, and mainstream and heritage subscales had associations with mean levels of moral 
identity in each context. The length of residence in Canada and immigrant status were entered as 
the first step; mainstream and heritage subscales were entered as the second step. Results 
indicated that mainstream acculturation positively predicted mean level of moral identity in each 
context. However, length of residence in Canada, immigrant status, or heritage enculturation did 
not relate to the mean levels of moral identity (Table 12).  
Cross-context differentiation of moral identity and culture.According to Baird et 
al’s., (2006) statistical procedure, an averaged standardized residual score was generated to 
reflect the cross-context differentiation in moral identity. Thus, the larger standardized residual 
score means more variability/differentiation; the smaller standardized residual indicates less 
context-differentiation. The results indicated that the standardized residual scores ofChinese-
Canadian participants (M = .018, SD = 1.12)were higherthan the scores ofChinese participants 
(M = -.233, SD = .86) butlower than the scores of Canadian participants (M = .227, SD = .96). 
Univariate Analysis of Variance indicated there was a significant difference in the cross-context 
differentiation cross-culturally, F(2, 414) = 7.99, p< .01, ɳ2 = .04. However, post-hoc test with 
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LSD correction revealed that Chinese-Canadian participants significantly differ from Chinese 
participants (p = .035) but do not differ from European-Canadian participants (p = .082) in the 
cross-context differentiation of moral identities. Recent and long-term immigrants did not differ 
in the cross-context differentiation of moral identities, F (1, 127) = .51, p = .48.  
Discussion 
Moral identity in bicultural Chinese Canadians was studied as an attempt to better 
understand the moral identities of this increasingly important cultural group in Canada. We 
explored the question of how moral identity acculturated in this cultural group. 
Methodologically, in addition to studying two distinct cultures, adding a bicultural group for 
investigating the role of culture and acculturation on moral identity never has been employed in 
past research. In many cases of immigration, individuals’ culturally constructed selves and 
identities are different from the cultural meaning system of the new culture to which they have 
moved (Berry, 1990). The current approach makes it possible to compare differences in the 
selves and identities that individuals experiencewhen encountering a new culture. Thus, this 
bicultural approach can provide us with a perspective on cultural influences different from those 
provided from a simple two cultural comparison in traditional cross-cultural psychology.   
In general, it was found that Chinese-Canadian moral identity in mean levels of moral 
identity, value domains, and cross-context differentiation, were more similar to European 
Canadians than to Chinese in China. This finding supports the notion of acculturation, with each 
person’s heritage self-concept being shifted a little over time and acculturated to the norms of 
Canadian culture. These individuals must reconcile the heritage moral values, and must decide 
where they fit in a society. In addition, there was no cultural difference on the mean-level of 
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moral identity in the context of family. This suggests moral identity hasasimilar functionin the 
context of familyamong the three cultural groups. 
In addition to the main hypothesis, it was found that Chinese-Canadian immigrants 
scored lower in the mean level of moral identity than European Canadians and Chinese in China. 
This result reflects the experience of a more complex social involvement for minority 
immigrants in a heterogeneous society. Within each cultural group, mainstream group members 
live in a relatively homogenous cultural environment, and they share values with their 
community. Consequently, heterogeneous societies do not easily accept outside groups because 
of their unified social values, and therefore socialization is difficult for minority immigrant 
groups (LaFromboise et al., 1993). The difficulty that minority groups (Chinese Canadians) 
experience in socializing with a dominant culture (European Canadians) may cause them to 
develop a lessened sense of belonging.  
The present findings also provide an insight to an issue of power relations. Studies of 
moral identity have been conducted primarily with “Western elite” populations (Miller, 2007). 
Little attention has been directed to examine the perspectives of minority subgroups who have 
limited power or are affected by oppressive social policies. It was found that recent immigrants 
assigned greater personal importance to Conformity-rule (e.g., follows the rules, law abiding) 
that they considered essential for defining a highly moral person than long-term immigrants; 
whereas, Universalism-concern (e.g., fair, just) tended to be more important for the long-term 
immigrants than for the recent immigrants. In this regard, as Shweder, Minow, and Markus 
(2002) have indicated, Western nations have experienced the arrival of a large number of 
immigrants from countries with cultural traditions that do not fit easily into the mainstream 
cultural practices of the host countries. Recent immigrants continue to maintain social ties with 
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their countries of origin and are not always eager to abandon their traditional values (Shweder, 
Markus, Minow, & Kessel, 1997). In order to fit in the mainstream social and legal system, 
compared to long-term immigrants, more recent immigrants must follow the rules of the 
mainstream society where citizenship has only a weak implication for the way in their lives. On 
the other hand, long-term immigrants have now become settled in the country. However, 
previous research has indicated Asian long-term immigrants and Asians born in the host country 
were more likely to report experiencing discrimination compared to those who were recent 
immigrants or who were born outside of the host country (Yip, Gee, & Takeuchi, 2008). Thus, in 
addition to following social orders, long-term immigrants are more aware of equal rights and 
justice and behave more like the majority citizens in the country than recent immigrants.  
 Examination of relations between moral identity in each context and acculturation 
demonstrated that mainstream acculturation to Canadian culture positively contributed to 
Chinese-Canadian immigrants’ mean-level of moral identity. Although heritage enculturation, 
was related to mainstream acculturation, it was not related to the mean-level of moral identity in 
each context. These findings correspond with Berry’s (1990) model of acculturation, which 
suggests that getting closer to the dominant society is not necessarily achieved by separating 
from one’s heritage group. In addition, neither length of residency in Canada nor immigration 
status predicted the mean-level of moral identity. Only mainstream acculturation remained a 
significant predictor. This result suggests thatactively immersing into Canadian societyplays a 
key role in supporting an individual’s motivation to seek a high level of moral identity through a 
high level of interaction with the mainstream society regardless of how long these immigrants 
have been in the country or their immigration statuses. 
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 The present study is not without limitations. First, it should be noted that this study is 
correlational in nature. Causal conclusions cannot be drawn. Longitudinal evidence is required to 
answer the question of the impact of acculturation on moral identity. For example, immigrants’ 
acculturation strategies and moral identities can be followed up in a number of years. It is likely 
that developing higher levels of acculturation through cultural engagements would provide a 
pathway for growth in immigrants’ moral identity, especially in the context of community and 
society. Second, the present study only assessed the process of mainstream/heritagedomains of 
acculturation. However, recent research with Canadian immigrants in Montreal has suggested 
that immigrants have a variety of orientations to their acculturation process (Berry & Sabatier, 
2010). Thus, future studies need to examine different acculturation paths such as assimilation, 
integration, marginalization and separation. It is likely that immigrants who are separated from 
the mainstream society would result in a lowlevel of moral identity among other acculturation 
strategies. Thirdly, the Chinese immigrants in the present study arrived in Canada within a 22-
year period. Only 23 participants out of 133 were born in Canada. In addition to the first-
generation immigrant, acculturation research typically includes second-generation immigrants 
(Berry, 1997) because they live at the intersection of two cultures. Future research should 
investigate the moral identity in the second generation independently.  
General Discussion and Conclusion 
 For centuries, psychologists and philosophers have tried to explain why people act 
morally. Kohlberg’s (1969) stage theory of moral development served this task for decades. 
However, evidence has suggested that moral reasoning aloneis not a strong predictor of moral 
action (e.g., Blasi, 1983). Therefore, new approaches to moral psychology have sought to find a 
link between moral judgment and moral actions. One topic that has been discussed is moral 
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identity, which is defined as “the degree to which being a moral person is important to an 
individual’s identity” (Hardy & Carlo, 2011, pp.212). Studies have demonstrated that 
internalizing moral identity can influence one’s moral action (e.g., Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016). 
While this line of research is promising, it has been questioned whether moral identity actually 
motivates one to act in a moral fashion in non-Western cultures. In addition, several cultural 
researchers on moral development have challenged the Western-centric notion of morality and 
found cross-cultural differences in moral reasoning (e.g., Gibbs et al., 2007), moral emotion 
(e.g., Krettenauer & Jia, 2013), moral ethics (e.g., Shweder et al., 1997), and interpersonal 
morality (e.g., Miller, 2007).  
 The current dissertation sought to address this question by examining cross-cultural 
similarities and differences in moral identities.Two major research questions were raised: First, 
do people from other cultures have a similar or different definition of a highly moral person? 
Second, do context and culture influence moral identity? It has been suggested that identity is 
differentiated into multiple facets and is reflected by unique social interactions that characterize 
an individual’s various social and cultural roles (e.g., Burke & Tully, 1997; Erikson, 1980).  
 Study I first evaluated whether people from China form different moral value attributes 
that define a highly moral person. Study Ia started to identify value attributes that describe 
individuals’ prototypical conception of a highly moral person in pre-existing Western cultural 
literature. Study Ib then asked Chinese participants to list attributes which are prototypical 
descriptors of a highly moral person. A culturally inclusive list of 90 moral value attributes that 
included unique values from Chinese culture was generated. Study Ic classified the value 
attributes into 13 domains by using Schwartz’ value circumplex (Schwartz et al., 2012). 
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 Study II used these moral value attributes and domains to assess how cultural 
representations shape moral identity in different contexts cross-culturally. Results indicated that 
there are some basic universal moral values; however, cultural differences in moral identities are 
marked in different value domains and social contexts. Indeed, people from both cultural groups 
selected and rated Benevolence and Universalism-toleranceas the cores of defining a moral 
person. This finding is consistent with previous work that found morality to be defined in terms 
of care and fairness concerns universally (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001). However, results also 
suggested that people do form distinct representations of moral identities. For example, the 
Chinese conceptions of moral identity included other domains such as Conformity-interpersonal, 
Security, Humble, and Traditionwhich reflected more of an interdependent self-construal of 
higher modesty and relational identities. With regard to context-specificity of moral identity, 
cultural differences were more pronounced. As expected, Chinese viewed the context of 
community/society and the context of school as more important for a highly moral person than 
Canadians. It suggests that Chinese are more likely to conceptualize moral identity as a part of 
citizenship related to national identity andnational patriotism, while also in accordance with the 
values ofConfucianism. In the Chinese educational system, the Confucian scholars advocate 
modesty and encourage friendly co-operation, giving priority to people’s relationships. The 
purpose of education is to shape every individual into a harmonious member of the society (Yu, 
2002). Finally, results on cross-context differentiation indicate that moral identities are less 
flexible and more interdependent through different contexts in Chinese culture than Canadian 
culture, which further suggests cultural orientations shape the conception of moral identity.  
 Study III extended the cross-cultural investigation of moral identity by adding a bicultural 
sample of Chinese-Canadian immigrants. Findings of an overall pattern on moral identity (e.g., 
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mean level of moral identity, value domains, and cross-context differentiation) in this cultural 
group suggested that cultural identity and acculturation also interact with moral identity. In the 
mean-level of moral identity, value domains, and cross-context differentiation, Chinese-
Canadian immigrants are similar to European Canadians. It suggests that the Chinese-Canadian 
immigrants gradually acculturate to the norms of Canadian mainstream culture.In addition, 
cultural differences in value domains illustrated power relations between recent and long-term 
immigrants. For example, long-term immigrants valued Universalism-concern as more important 
to define a moral person than recent immigrants did. This result may imply that long-term 
immigrants are concerned with values of fairness and justice that these values are most in need in 
a multicultural society (Miller, 2007).  
Overall, these studies provide strong support that moral identity has some basic universal 
functions, but influences of culture and context indeed impact on various aspects of moral 
identity. This follows previous work that found morality is not culturally universal and identity 
needs to be studied in different levels of interaction among persons, context, and culture. The 
current studies are the first to compare East and West and therefore the first to provide evidence 
of the influence of cultural orientation on moral identity.Given the novelty of this dissertation, 
these results may lead to as many questions as they have answers. Some of the implications are 
presented in order to facilitate research for future studies on this topic.   
Cultural Psychology Approach in Investigation of Moral Identity 
 Cultural psychology is a sub-discipline that examines the cultural foundations of 
psychological processes and human behavior. Most research on human behavior reported in 
mainstream psychology (such as social, development, cognitive and behavioral neuroscience) 
comes from studies conducted in Western counties, especially from the U.S and Canada. 
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Considering that Americans and Canadians comprise only a small fraction of the world’s 
population, cultural psychologists have questioned the applicability of findings based on a single 
demographic to the larger majority of people around the world (Arnett, 2008). In one of the most 
influential papersin psychology entitled “The neglected 95%: Why American psychology needs 
to become less American”, Jeffrey Arnett (2008) conducted a meta-analysis that examined 4,037 
articles from six top APA journals (Developmental Psychology, Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, Journal of Abnormal Psychology, Journal of Family Psychology, Health 
Psychology, Journal of Educational Psychology) over a 20-year period to demonstrate the 
narrow focus of research psychology in the United States. Among the 4,037 articles, he found 
only 3% of the samples were collected in Asia, 1% were in Latin America, and less than 1% 
were in Africa or the Middle East (Arnett, 2008). Other cultural psychologists have also 
suggested that most research to date is based on “WEIRD” (western, educated, industrialized, 
rich, and democratic) cultures which are not representative of everyone as a whole; however, 
psychologists regularly use them to make broad, and quite likely false claims about human 
behaviors (Henrich et al., 2010).  
 In this dissertation, I did not take such an extreme view. I believe that there is nothing 
fundamentally wrong with such research on moral identity, and the findings obtained from 
Western countries are valid for those samples at the times and places in which the studies were 
conducted. Those findings may be replicable across multiple samples in Western societies using 
different methods such as self-report (Aquino & Reed, 2002) and interview (Arnold, 2000), and 
those methods can be applicable to non-WEIRD societies; however, thelevels and degrees of the 
accessibility ofmoral identity across cultures must be investigated (e.g., functional universal view 
of culture in Henrich et al., 2010). Moral identity does exist in both Eastern and Western 
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cultures, yet it has a different accessibility to people and is used in varying levels of degrees from 
one culture to another. 
 Study I and II found clear support for the cultural notion of moral identity between 
Chinese and Canadians using the cross-cultural approach. In those studies, I used Chinese in 
China and Canadians in Canada as comparison groups. Those groups have their own unique 
sociocultural history, language, government, norms, and economic bases, all of which affect 
culture which in turn facilitates and shapes the conception of moral identity. Even though there is 
a large overlap of moral value domains between the two groups, this overlap is not necessarily 
surprising from a theoretical standpoint of morality. However, specific cultural values in China 
such as interdependent-self, collectivism, and Confucianism lead to different characterizations of 
moral identity. For example, Chinese moral identity emphasizes interpersonal relationships as 
well as community. What makes a highly moral person extends beyond individual moral 
behavior and instead grounded in social groups such as community or nation.In China, moral 
understanding relies heavily on considering one’s duties, obligations and roles within society 
(Ma, 1997). Thus, in Chinese culture, people are more likely to base their moral identity on the 
context of society and community.        
 Study III addressed the cultural issue of moral identity by examining Chinese-Canadian 
immigrants using a bicultural approach. This approach is different from the cross-cultural 
perspective because the bicultural approach is concerned with the psychological reactions of 
individuals and groups caught up in culturally heterogeneous settings including the values, 
feelings, beliefs, and attitudes that result from living in such conditions (Bochner, 1999). People 
from different cultural, ethnic, or linguistic backgrounds come into social contact with each 
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other. These frequent contacts lead to a change in acculturation process and cultural identity 
which in turn influences people’s moral outlooks (Bochner, 1999).  
Three levels of Interaction in Investigation of Moral Identity 
Erikson (1980) has proposed identity and morality are interconnected. Furthermore, he 
has theorized a three-level model (ego-personal, personal-social and social-structural) to study 
identity. His model provides insight used to refine moral identity constructs. This dissertation 
attempted to establish a social-developmental approach encompassing all levels of self, from the 
most basic personal characters in ego identity to the individual’s uniqueness in a socio-cultural 
context. Study Ia and Ib started to apply both “personal-ego” (moral attributes) and “social-
structural” (culture) levels of moral identity by introducing a new empirical approach for 
assessing moral identity to establish a culturally inclusive list of prototypical conceptions of a 
highly moral person in Western and Chinese cultures. Study II investigates the “personal-social” 
(context) levelsin addition to “ego-personal” and “social-structural” levels by investigating 
cultural similarities and differences in moral identity between Canada and China in the contexts 
of family, school and community/society. Study III extends all three levels to explore the degree 
to which there is a match between the sociocultural environments in the immigrants’ culture of 
origin with regard to different value domains, contexts and cultures. Thus, moral identity is 
better understood in the context of individuals’ personal, social, and cultural environment rather 
than in isolation.  
 In addition, interactions among personal, social, and cultural contexts serve as a fertile 
foundation in moral identity in the migration process. Immigrants move from a familiar 
environment in which moral values in their communities and cultures are well defined to an 
unfamiliar cultural context. During their migration, their context changes, and all that they are 
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familiar with becomes the unknown. When their acculturation experiences change within the 
different layers, such changes affect the formation of moral identity because of the different 
belief systems and cultural norms that exist in their host country. Additionally, the changes of 
values come from imposed rules within the host culture and affect rules learned from the country 
of origin (Berry, 1997). Most minority culture members face a challenge between holding on to 
their own moral values and adopting the majority cultural and moral values.   
Collectivism vs. Individualism or Uniqueness of Chinese Culture 
 Even though most of the cross-cultural research is primarily guided by the dimension 
between individualism and collectivism or the concept of self-construals, the current dissertation 
suggests how uniqueness of Chinese society shapes the conception of moral identity in addition 
to the dimensions of individualism/collectivism and self-construals. Chinese culture is in a 
largesenseaproduct of its long history. The traditional aspects of Chinese culture are rooted in the 
pervasive influence of Confucianism whichreflects the traditional Chinese outlook on life, ethics 
and morality (Wang & Mao, 1996). Many of his principles, including respect for authority, 
patriarchy, and worshipping traditions, are still reflected in the structure of family, education, 
and the wider society. Confucian educators suggest that respect for authority in China has deep 
connections with the rigid social and educational systems (Wang & Mao, 1996). Children are 
expected to obey the requirements of parents without questions. This is closely linked with the 
concept of filial piety which requires absolute obedience and complete devotion to parents (Yu, 
2002). The respect for authority also extends to relationships and power distances between 
teachers and students in schools.This stance clearly influences classrooms through lectures and 
demonstrations rather than learning through discussions. In addition, Chinese traditional values 
emphasize collective benefits as more important than individual needs. Being equal, avoiding 
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competition or conflict were among the popularly accepted values (Satow& Wang, 1994). Group 
approaches have been a dominating influence on Chinese social life including teamwork, group 
decision-making, group reward, and group cohesiveness (Satow& Wang, 1994).  
 The second aspect of how Chinese culture shapes moral identity is socialism which 
became influential following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. While 
Confucius is the dominant figure of the traditional culture in China, the central influence on the 
socialist culture was its leader, Mao in the Communist party. Bush and Haiyan (2000) claim that 
communism and Confucianism have much in common. Moral education for example involves a 
blend of both principles, while socialism also serves to reinforce national identities. Moreover, 
inthe school system, each school is expected to have a department sponsored by the communist 
party to make sure that educational policy follows the party’s direction and provides political 
education to faculty and students (Bush &Haiyan, 2000). Thus, the socialist values of the 
Communist party have been integrated with traditional beliefs to create a distinctive Chinese 
culture.  
 In addition, in today’s global world, increasingly more Western cultural icons and 
practices have been imported into Chinese society. Those imports of Western culture such as 
media, ideology, business, and festivals may lead today’s Chinese people to hold a balance 
between Western and Eastern values. Our results provide further evidence that although Chinese 
individuals were traditionally considered as having an Eastern orientation of moral identities 
such as Tradition, Security, and Conformity-interpersonal value domains due to the influence of 
the Chinese traditional culture, they could also show Western aspects of moral identities such as 
Self-direction and Hedonism with the process of globalization and westernization.  
Future Research 
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 In addition to addressing the implications posed above, future research should build on 
the current studies. First, further work is needed to examine the mechanism underlying the 
relationship between moral identity and moral action using the refined moral identity construct in 
both Western and other societies. Hertz and Krettenauer (2016) found a lower effect size of 
moral identity as a predictor of moral action in Asian countries. They suggested moral actions in 
the collectivistic cultures might be reflected by group norms rather than an individual’s moral 
identity. Thus, research is needed to follow up this work by examining the link between moral 
identity in different contexts and its relation to moral behaviors. One may expect individuals 
with a stronger moral identity in the context of community and society would have a greater 
effecton prosocial actionsat least in Chinese culture.   
 Second, it would be interesting to examine the impact of social changes on people’s 
moral identity in China. Unlike other Eastern countries, China has entered a period of 
institutional shift and rapid social and cultural changes after the 21
st
 century, including changes 
in the economic system, education, health system, mass communication, and globalization. This 
drastic transition seems to have created a disruption of cultural identities of Chinese youth 
(Wang, 2006). Different generations could be shaped by different social experiences in their 
formative years. Thus, different generations might have different values due to both the varied 
life course and cultural setting of the socialization. Two questions should be studied in this line 
of research: Is there a difference in moral values between different generations in China? Do 
younger generations tend to shift from traditional moral values to modern self-direction in a 
recent social transformational process?Longitudinal research is needed to answer these 
questions.  
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 Third, the dimensions of individualism/collectivism or independent/interdependent have 
served as the foundation for the current cross-cultural research; however, it is not the only 
dimension that we can consider. For example, the dimension of societal tightness, power 
distance, uncertainty avoidance, and social complexity have also been developed, but these new 
dimensions have not yet received as much attention (Oyserman et al., 2002). Thus, future 
research should continue to explore these other possible dimensions of cultures in order to have a 
better system for understanding cultural variation. In addition, the current study only has one 
country to represent Eastern or Western society. More countriesto present each societyare needed 
in future research. It is likely that there should be cultural differences in how people perceive and 
define moral identity within each society.   
 Last but not least, there have been increasing calls to consider culture as the context of 
diversity to study in Moral psychology (Miller, 2007). Future studies should expand the scope of 
the cultural diversity beyond a single ethnic group in Canada. For example, Asian Canadians 
represent a fast-growing, extremely diverse population and there is no singular, unified Asian 
Canadian community but a vast number of ethnic communities that maintain some ties to their 
Asian cultural roots (Okazki& Saw, 2010). Thus, future studies should investigate differences of 
moral beliefs among other ethnic groups such as Indian Canadians, Korean Canadians, Japanese 
Canadians etc. In addition to deliberate sample selection, cultural priming could be used in future 
research to test the causal effects of culture on moral identity. Many priming studies in cultural 
psychology have observed that beliefs, judgments, and behaviors shift towards the norms of the 
primed culture (Benet-Martinez, Leu, Lee, & Morris, 2002).  
Conclusion 
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 In summary, the current studies provide the first empirical support to consider context 
and cultural influences on moral identity as well as limitations in measures and 
conceptualizations of the moral identity construct.Based on the three studies described above, I 
conclude that moral identity consists of multiple components and individuals differ 
systematically and cross-culturally in how their moral identities are definedand differentiated 
from each other rather than integrated into a unitary identity. This dissertation thus helps to 
address previous questions and limitations about whether the moral identity construct is 
contextually and culturally dependent (Hardy & Carlo, 2005; Krettenauer et al., 2016). Given the 
novelty of these results, they provide several promising directions for future research.  
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Table 1. Eighty Western Attributes Defining Individuals’ Conception of a Highly Moral Person 
dependable, faithful, genuine, honest, loyal, reliable, 
responsible, sincere, trustworthy, truthful, listens,  
open-minded, patient, respectful, tolerant, 
understanding, wise, altruistic, benevolent, caring, 
forgiving, generous, helpful, kind, loving, selfless, 
sharing, fair, just, compassionate, law abiding, ethical, 
hard-working, perseveres, self-disciplined, intelligent, 
considerate, cooperative, courteous, conscientious,  
accepting, confident, consistent, 
educated, empathic, follows the rules, 
fun, good, happy, has high standards, 
has integrity, healthy, humble, makes 
the right choices, nice, non-judgmental, 
obedient, proper, proud, religious, 
virtuous 
friendly, sociable, modest, grateful, 
courageous, independent, rational, 
self-assured, exemplary, honorable, 
upstanding, clean, cheerful, 
knowledgeable, righteous,  knows 
what is right and wrong, optimistic, 
strong, thrifty 
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Table 2. Cultural Inclusive Attributes Defining Individuals’ Conception of a Highly Moral Person 
Culturally Shared Attributes (59 items) Western Unique Attributes (21) Chinese Unique Attributes (17 items) 
dependable, faithful, genuine, honest, loyal, reliable, 
responsible, sincere, trustworthy, truthful, listens, open-
minded, patient, respectful, tolerant,understanding, wise, 
altruistic, benevolent, caring, forgiving, generous, 
helpful, kind, loving, selfless, sharing, fair, just, 
compassionate, law abiding, ethical, hard-working, 
perseveres, self-disciplined, intelligent, considerate, 
cooperative, courteous, conscientious, friendly, sociable, 
modest, grateful, courageous, independent, rational, self-
assured¹, exemplary, honorable, upstanding¹, clean, 
cheerful¹, knowledgeable, righteous,  knows what is right 
and wrong, optimistic, strong, thrifty 
accepting, confident, consistent, 
educated, empathic¹, follows the rules, 
fun, good, happy, has high standards, 
has integrity¹, healthy, humble, makes 
the right choices, nice¹, non-
judgmental, obedient, proper, proud, 
religious, virtuous¹. 
credible, incorruptible, warm-hearted, 
peaceful, diligent, motivated, 
civilized, ambitious, dedicated, 
patriotic, solidaric, prudent, careful, 
principled,filial piety, outgoing, 
active 
Note: ¹: The seven attributes were removed from the final lists due to translation issues (see main text for further explanation) 
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Table 3. Value Domains and Attributes Defining Individuals’ Conception of a Highly Moral Person 
Value Domain 
Attributes 
Benevolence-dependability:Being a reliable and trustworthy group member 
Dependable, faithful, genuine, honest, loyal, reliable, responsible, sincere, trustworthy, truthful,credible, incorruptible 
Universalism-tolerance: Acceptance of those who are different from oneself 
Accepting, listens, non-judgmental, open-minded, patient, respectful, tolerant, understanding, wise 
Benevolence-caring:Devotion to the welfare of ingroup members 
Altruistic, benevolent, caring, forgiving, generous, helpful, kind, loving, selfless, sharing, warm-hearted 
Universalism-concern: Commitment to equality, justice and protection for all 
Fair, just, compassionate, peaceful 
Conformity-rules:Compliance with rules, laws and formal obligations 
Follows the rules, law abiding, obedient, ethical, principled 
Achievement:Success according to social standard 
Hard-working, perseveres, proud, self-disciplined, educated, intelligent,diligent, motivated, ambitious 
Conformity-interpersonal:Avoidance of upsetting other people 
Considerate, cooperative, courteous, conscientious, friendly, sociable, civilized 
Humble: Recognizing one's insignificance in the larger scheme of things 
Humble, modest, grateful, dedicated 
Self-direction:Cultivate one's own ideas and determine one's own action 
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Confident, consistent, courageous, independent, rational 
Face:Maintaining once public image and avoiding humiliation 
Exemplary, honorable 
Security:Safety and stability in one's immediate environment and the wider society 
Clean, healthy, patriotic, solidaric, prudent, careful 
Hedonism:Pleasure and sensuous gratification 
fun, happy 
Tradition:Respect of the customs and ideas that traditional culture 
Religious, Filial piety 
Unclassified:  
Good, has high standards, knowledgeable, knows what is right and wrong, makes the rightchoices, optimistic, proper, righteous, strong, 
thrifty, outgoing, active 
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Table 4: Gender and Culture Interaction on Moral identity 
              Canadian                 Chinese                          
 Male Female  Male Female 
Moral Identity Overall  4.05 (.07) 4.11 (.05) 4.39 (.06) 4.08 (.06) 
Family Context 4.21 (.08) 4.14 (.06) 4.31 (.08) 4.00 (.05) 
School Context 3.92 (.07) 4.08 (.05) 4.39 (.07) 4.07 (.07) 
Community/Society Context 4.02 (.08) 4.11 (.06) 4.47 (.07) 4.17 (.07) 
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Table 5. Value Domains and Attributes Defining Individuals’ Moral Identity, Relative Frequency in Each Culture 
 
Value Domain/Attributes Canadians 
M% (SD) 
Chinese 
M% (SD) 
Benevolence-dependability: Being a reliable and trustworthy group member 
 Dependable, faithful, genuine, honest, loyal, reliable, responsible, sincere, trustworthy, 
truthful, credible, incorruptible 
 30.06 (.32) 18.41(.22) 
Universalism-tolerance: Acceptance of those who are different from oneself 
 Accepting, listens, non-judgmental, open-minded, patient, respectful, tolerant, understanding, 
wise 
 24.08 (.32) 10.02 (.21) 
Benevolence-caring: Devotion to the welfare of ingroup members 
 Altruistic, benevolent, caring, forgiving, generous, helpful, kind, loving, selfless, sharing, 
warm-hearted 
 9.00 (.21) 11.92 (.19) 
Universalism-concern: Commitment to equality, justice and protection for all 
 Fair, just, compassionate, peaceful 
 3.98 (.15) 4.89 (.13) 
Conformity-rules: Compliance with rules, laws and formal obligations 
 Follows the rules, law abiding, obedient, ethical, principled 
 3.86 (.12) 4.48 (.16) 
Achievement: Success according to social standards 
 Hard-working, perseveres, proud, self-disciplined, educated, intelligent, diligent, motivated, 
ambitious 
 3.88 (.15) 3.84 (.14) 
Conformity-interpersonal: Avoidance of upsetting other people  3.50 (.12) 9.82 (.22) 
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 Considerate, cooperative, courteous, conscientious, friendly, sociable, civilized 
Humble: Recognizing one's insignificance in the larger scheme of things 
 Humble, modest, grateful, dedicated 
 3.12(.12) 5.89 (.12) 
Self-direction: Cultivate one's own ideas and determine one's own action 
 Confident, consistent, courageous, independent, rational 
 1.82(.07) 6.01 (.11) 
Face: Maintaining once public image and avoiding humiliation 
 Exemplary, honorable 
 1.32(.05) .10 (.01) 
Security: Safety and stability in one's immediate environment and the wider society 
 Clean, healthy, patriotic, solidaric, prudent, careful 
 .50(.04) 9.00 (.18) 
Hedonism: Pleasure and sensuous gratification 
 Fun, happy 
 .10 (.01) 1.63 (.07) 
Tradition: Respect of the customs and ideas that traditional culture 
 Religious, Filial piety 
 .07 (.00) 5.45 (.13) 
Unclassified:  
 Good, has high standards, knowledgeable, knows what is right and wrong, active 
makes the right choices, optimistic, proper, strong, thrifty,righteous,outgoing 
14.71 (.27) 8.55 (.15) 
 
 
 
 
MORAL IDENTITY AND CULTURE                                                                                                                                                 103 
 
Table 6. Analysis of Variance for Specific Value Domains between Cultures 
Value Domains  F  p  ɳ² 
Benevolence-dependability 8.84 .003 .044 
Universalism-tolerance 13.42 .000 .065 
Benevolence-caring 1.05 .306 .005 
Universalism-concern .21 .649 .001 
Conformity-rules .09 .763 .001 
Achievement .00 .985 .000 
Conformity-interpersonal 6.54 .012 .032 
Humble 2.67 .104 .014 
Self-direction 9.59 .002 .047 
Face 5.41 .021 .027 
Security 21.38 .000 .099 
Hedonism 4.06 .045 .021 
Tradition 15.74 .000 .075 
Unclassified 4.01 .047 .020 
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Table 7. Mean Scores of Moral Identity across Contexts and Cultures 
 Family Context School Context 
 
Community/Society 
Context 
Canadian 4.16 (.66) 4.03 (.63) 4.08 (.67) 
Chinese 4.14 (.56) 4.22 (.53) 4.31 (.53) 
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Table 8. Mean Scores of Acculturation in Recent and Long-Term Chinese-Canadian Immigrants (Study III) 
 Heritage  Mainstream 
Recent  5.74 (.70) 5.15 (.86) 
Long-term 5.23 (.96) 5.26 (.74) 
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Table 9.Mean Scores of Moral Identity across Contexts and Cultures (Study III) 
 Family Context School Context 
 
Community/Society 
Context 
Chinese 4.14 (.59) 4.22 (.53) 4.31 (.53) 
European Canadian 4.13 (.63) 4.01 (.60) 4.06 (.62) 
Chinese Canadian 4.06 (.69) 3.95 (.63) 3.88 (.73) 
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Table 10. Mean Differences of Moral Identity across Culturesin Each Context (Study III) 
 Family Context School Context 
 
Community/Society 
Context 
Chinese Canadian vs. European Canadian -.07 -.05   -.18 
Chinese Canadian vs. Chinese in China -.08 -.26** -.44** 
** p< 0.1 
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Table 11. Value Domains and Attributes Defining Individuals’ Moral Identity, Relative Frequency in Each Culture                                          
 
Value Domain/Attributes European 
Canadians 
M% (SD) 
Chinese 
Canadians 
M% (SD) 
Chinese 
M% (SD) 
Benevolence-dependability: Being a reliable and trustworthy group member 
 Dependable, faithful, genuine, honest, loyal, reliable, responsible, sincere, 
trustworthy, truthful, credible, incorruptible 
 29.34(.34)           30.94 (.30) 18.41  (.22) 
Universalism-tolerance: Acceptance of those who are different from oneself 
 Accepting, listens, non-judgmental, open-minded, patient, respectful, tolerant, 
understanding, wise 
 24.38 (.35) 13.51(.18) 10.02 (.21) 
Benevolence-caring: Devotion to the welfare of ingroup members 
 Altruistic, benevolent, caring, forgiving, generous, helpful, kind, loving, 
selfless, sharing, warm-hearted 
 10.55 (.23) 12.23(.19) 11.92 (.19) 
Universalism-concern: Commitment to equality, justice and protection for all 
 Fair, just, compassionate, peaceful 
 4.64 (.17) 5.40(.13) 4.89 (.13) 
Conformity-rules: Compliance with rules, laws and formal obligations 
 Follows the rules, law abiding, obedient, ethical, principled 
 4.41 (.14) 6.29(.20) 4.48 (.16) 
Achievement: Success according to social standards 
 Hard-working, perseveres, proud, self-disciplined, educated, intelligent, 
diligent, motivated, ambitious 
 2.38(.12) 3.03(.09) 3.84 (.14) 
Conformity-interpersonal: Avoidance of upsetting other people  3.61 (.13) 4.43(.10) 9.82 (.22) 
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 Considerate, cooperative, courteous, conscientious, friendly, sociable, civilized 
Humble: Recognizing one's insignificance in the larger scheme of things 
 Humble, modest, grateful, dedicated 
 4.22 (.14) 2.37(.07) 5.89 (.12) 
Self-direction: Cultivate one's own ideas and determine one's own action 
 Confident, consistent, courageous, independent, rational 
 .03 (.00) 2.25(.05) 6.01 (.11) 
Face: Maintaining once public image and avoiding humiliation 
 Exemplary, honorable 
 1.55 (.06) 1.24(.04) .10 (.01) 
Security: Safety and stability in one's immediate environment and the wider 
society 
 Clean, healthy, patriotic, solidaric, prudent, careful 
 .00(.00) 1.19(.04) 9.00 (.18) 
Hedonism: Pleasure and sensuous gratification 
 Fun, happy 
 .10 (.01) 3.27(.14) 1.63 (.07) 
Tradition: Respect of the customs and ideas that traditional culture 
 Religion, Filial piety 
 .00(.00) .48(.03) 5.45 (.13) 
Unclassified:  
 Good, has high standards, knowledgeable, knows what is right and wrong, 
active, makes the right choices, optimistic, proper, strong, 
thrifty,righteous,outgoing 
   14.44(.26) 13.33 (.23) 8.55 (.15) 
MORAL IDENTITY AND CULTURE                                                                                     110 
 
Table 12: HierarchicalRegression of Acculturation on MeanLevel of Moral Identity in 
EachContext 
Step and predictors β ΔF df ΔR² 
Family Context     
  First step  .38 2, 103 .01 
Length of Residency  -.18    
Immigrant Statuses .17    
  Second Step  17.04** 2, 101 .25** 
Length of Residency  .09    
Immigrant Statuses -.04    
Heritage Enculturation .19    
Mainstream Acculturation .40**    
  Final model  8.77** 4, 101 .26** 
School. Context     
  First step  2.66 2, 103 .05 
Length of Residency  -.22    
Immigrant Statuses -.01    
  Second Step  10.79** 2, 101 .17** 
Length of Residency  -.05    
Immigrant Statuses -.16    
Heritage Enculturation 
Mainstream Acculturation 
.07 
.38** 
   
  Final model  6.98** 4, 101 .22** 
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Community/Society Context     
  First step  1.71 2, 103 .03 
Length of Residency  -.27    
Immigrant Statuses .11    
  Second Step  10.20** 2, 101 .16** 
Length of Residency  -.06    
Immigrant Statuses -.05    
Heritage Enculturation .15    
Mainstream Acculturation .33**    
  Final model  6.11** 4, 101 .20** 
Note: ** p< .01
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Table 13. Value Domains and Attributes Defining Individuals’ Moral Identity, Relative Frequency inRecent and Long-term Chinese-
Canadian Immigrants 
 
Value Domain/Attributes Recent  
M% (SD) 
Long-term 
M% (SD) 
Benevolence-dependability: Being a reliable and trustworthy group member 
 Dependable, faithful, genuine, honest, loyal, reliable, responsible, sincere, trustworthy, 
truthful, credible, incorruptible 
 33.59 (.32) 21.71(.21) 
Universalism-tolerance: Acceptance of those who are different from oneself 
 Accepting, listens, non-judgmental, open-minded, patient, respectful, tolerant, understanding, 
wise 
 13.49 (.19) 14.80(.15) 
Benevolence-caring: Devotion to the welfare of ingroup members 
 Altruistic, benevolent, caring, forgiving, generous, helpful, kind, loving, selfless, sharing, 
warm-hearted 
 11.46(.22) 11.02(.15) 
Universalism-concern: Commitment to equality, justice and protection for all 
 Fair, just, compassionate, peaceful 
 3.41 (.11) 11.53(.18) 
Conformity-rules: Compliance with rules, laws and formal obligations 
 Follows the rules, law abiding, obedient, ethical, principled 
 9.49 (.25) .48(.02) 
Achievement: Success according to social standards 
 Hard-working, perseveres, proud, self-disciplined, educated, intelligent, diligent, motivated, 
ambitious 
 2.62 (.07) 5.24(.14) 
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Conformity-interpersonal: Avoidance of upsetting other people 
 Considerate, cooperative, courteous, conscientious, friendly, sociable, civilized 
 2.80 (.08) 5.25(.14) 
Humble: Recognizing one's insignificance in the larger scheme of things 
 Humble, modest, grateful, dedicated 
 2.98(.08) 1.77(.05) 
Self-direction: Cultivate one's own ideas and determine one's own action 
 Confident, consistent, courageous, independent, rational 
 1.81(.05) 3.59(.06) 
Face: Maintaining once public image and avoiding humiliation 
 Exemplary, honorable 
 1.68(.05) .65(.01) 
Security: Safety and stability in one's immediate environment and the wider society 
 Clean, healthy, patriotic, solidaric, prudent, careful 
 1.67(.05) .48(.02) 
Hedonism: Pleasure and sensuous gratification 
 Fun, happy 
 4.95(.18) .48(.02) 
Tradition: Respect of the customs and ideas that traditional culture 
 Religious, Filial piety 
 .00(.00) .00(.00) 
Unclassified:  
 Good, has high standards, knowledgeable, knows what is right and wrong, active 
makes the right choices, optimistic, proper, strong, thrifty,righteous,outgoing 
10.05 (.21) 23.01 (.28) 
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Figure 1. Percentage of attributes in each value domains  
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Figure 2: Mean levels of moral identity in three contexts and cultures in Study III  
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Figure 3: Average percentage of attributes defining a highly moral person in three cultural groups in Study III 
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Figure 4: Average percentage of attributes defining a highly moral person between recent and long-term Chinese-Canadian 
immigrants 
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Appendix A: Chinese Measure in Study I-b 
 个人家庭资料 
 
 
出生日期:    年月 0 日 
 
 
1. 性别，请选择.男 1 女 2    
 
 
2. 出生城市: 
 
 
3. 民族 (比如: 汉族, 满族, 回族等等.) 
 
 
4. 大学第几年？: 
学科类型: (比如：社会科学/（文科）, 自然科学（理科）, 工程（工科）) ： 
未来专业: 
 
4. 请打√ 
教育程度 母亲 父亲 
高中以下   
高中毕业   
一些大学   
大学毕业   
职业学院   
研究生(硕士，博士，法学，医
学等) 
  
 
 
5. 你父母现在的职业是? (如果父母暂时没有工作，那上一个工作是什么?)  
 
母亲 
 
父亲 
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分自由列举：品德高尚的人的特征 
 
指导语: 请思考品德高尚的人的一些特征？怎样去形容一个品德高尚的人? 
在空里，请填入形容品德高尚的人的性格特征: (至少15个特征)  （比如说：诚实的） 
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Appendix B: Chinese-English Translation of Moral Attributes 
_____爱国 patriotic _____ 节俭 thrifty _____ 荣誉的 honourable _____ 有爱 loving  
_____ 爱好和平 peaceful _____ 可靠 reliable _____ 认真 conscientious _____ 有同情心
compassionate 
_____ 不盲目批判 non-
judgmental 
_____ 开朗 outgoing _____ 善良 kind _____ 有宗教信仰的
religious 
_____ 不计前嫌 forgiving _____ 乐于助人 helpful _____ 善解人意
understanding 
_____ 有教养 educated 
 
_____ 包容 tolerant _____ 乐于奉献 dedicated _____ 思想开明 open-
minded 
_____ 有正义感 righteous 
_____ 表里一致 consistent _____ 乐观 optimistic _____ 是非分明 knows what 
is right/wrong 
_____有趣  fun 
_____ 诚信 credible _____ 伦理的 ethical _____ 善于社交 sociable _____ 有爱心, 关心的
caring 
_____ 诚实 honest _____ 廉洁 incorruptible _____ 团结 solidaric _____ 有理想 ambitious 
_____ 诚恳 genuine _____ 理性 rational _____ 踏实 dependable _____ 有责任心 responsible 
_____ 懂得感恩 grateful _____ 礼貌 courteous _____ 利他的，无私心的
altruistic 
_____ 值得信赖的
trustworthy 
_____ 独立 independent  _____ 明智的 wise _____ 为他人着想
considerate 
_____ 尊重人的 respectful 
_____ 懂得分享 sharing  _____模范的 exemplary _____ 文明的 civilized _____ 忠诚 loyal 
_____ 服从的 obedient  _____ 努力的 hardworking _____ 无私，不自私
selfless 
_____ 整洁 clean 
_____ 公平 fair  _____ 耐心 patient _____ 稳重 prudent _____ 智慧 intelligent 
_____ 公正 just  _____ 能做正确决定的
makes the right choices 
_____ 孝顺 filial piety _____ 正直 upstanding 
_____ 高标准 has high 
standards 
_____ 善于倾听 listens _____ 幸福的 happy _____ 真诚 sincere 
_____ 合作的 cooperative  _____ 勤奋的 diligent _____ 心胸宽广 generous _____ 知识渊博
knowledgeable 
_____ 好的 good _____ 谦逊 humble _____ 细心 careful _____ 自信 self-confident 
_____ 健康 healthy  _____ 虔诚 faithful _____ 易接受的/赞同的
accepting 
_____ 自律 self-disciplined 
MORAL IDENTITY AND CULTURE 121 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____ 坚强 strong _____恰当的 proper _____ 勇敢 courageous _____ 自豪的 proud 
_____ 坚持不懈的
perseveres 
_____ 谦虚 modest _____ 友好 friendly _____ 遵守条例 follows the 
rules 
_____ 坦诚 truthful _____仁慈 benevolent _____ 有上进心 motivated _____ 遵纪守法 law-abiding 
_____ 积极 active _____ 热心 warm-hearted _____ 有原则 principled  
